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A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis of the Obligations of 
Third-Party Certifiers 
JAN DE BRUYNE 
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS AND 
THIRD-PARTY CERTIFIERS 
Certifiers are entities that provide services of certification.1  Certifiers 
attest that a certified product, service, information, or person (further 
referred to as “item”) possesses certain qualifications or meets safety, 
quality, or technical standards.2  The certification process can take different 
forms and often involves several parties.3  Besides first4 and second-party 
certification,5 third-party certification is performed by organizations that are 
independent vis-à-vis the entity that manufactures the products, offers 
services, or provides information (further referred to as the “requesting 
entity”).6  Such certification implies that an independent body determines 
whether the item complies with the applicable technical and safety 
 
 Jan De Bruyne (Master in Law, Ghent University & Master EU Studies, Ghent University) is an 
Academic Assistant in the field of comparative and private law at the Ghent University Law School.  He 
has been a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of European and Comparative Law of Oxford University in 
2014 and at the Center for European Legal Studies of the University of Cambridge in 2015. 
 1. Certification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., 
UNITED STATES CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES 5 (2011). 
 2. Certification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY; AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 1. 
 3. U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 2nd Party Conformity Assessment, AM. NAT’L 
STANDARDS INST., 
 https://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/suppliers_declaration.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2017). 
 4. First-party certification implies that the manufacturers of the products or the providers of 
services and information provide the certification themselves.  It is the party that markets those products 
or offers the service and information—for example, a manufacturer of medical devices, an issuer of 
financial instruments, or a shipowner—that takes the necessary steps to determine whether those items 
comply with the applicable requirements.  See U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 1st Party Conformity 
Assessment, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., 
https://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/suppliers_declaration.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2017). 
 5. Second-party certification occurs when a person or an organization, having a user interest in a 
product, service, or information—the purchaser or user of the certified product, service or information—
establishes whether these items comply with the applicable technical and safety standards.  See AM. 
NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 1. The certification is performed by the party purchasing the 
products or relying on the services to ensure their compliance with the agreed (contractual) requirements 
and (technical) specifications. European Fed’n of Nat’l Ass’ns of Measurement, Testing and Analytical 
Labs., First-, Second- and Third-Party Testing – How and When, EUROLAB, May 2000, at 3, 
www.eurolab.org/documents/1-2000.doc. 
 6. See AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 1. 
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standards and requirements.7  Most certified products, services, or 
information bear the certifier’s mark to help consumers or other buyers 
making decisions.8  Third-party certifiers9 provide their services at the 
request of their clients.10  The certificate they issue is the performance under 
the certification contract.11  However, the information included in this 
attestation can and will also be used by people with whom they do not have 
any contractual relationship or even by the public at large.12  Certifiers 
moderate informational asymmetries that distort or prevent efficient 
transactions by providing the public with information it would otherwise not 
have.13  This function is so important, one could say that without certifiers 
“efficient trade would often be distorted, curtailed, or blocked”.14 
Although certifiers provide their services in several sectors,15 the article 
focusses on credit rating agencies (CRAs) in financial markets, 
classification societies in the maritime industry, and notified bodies in the 
medical sector.16  CRAs such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
evaluate the creditworthiness of financial instruments or issuers of such 
 
 7. See U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 3rd Party Conformity Assessment, AM. NAT’L 
STANDARDS INST., 
https://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/3party_conformity_assessment.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
 8. See id. (stating that certification may be appropriate if the market demands or allows it). 
 9. When this article refers to certifiers, it only relates to third-party certifiers unless indicated 
otherwise. 
 10. European Fed’n of Nat’l Ass’ns of Measurement, Testing and Analytical Labs., supra note 5, 
at 8-9. 
 11. See, e.g, General Conditions for Certification Services, SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE 
SURVEILLANCE (June 2005),  
www.sgs.com/en/Terms-and-Conditions/General-Conditions-for-Certification-Services-English.aspx. 
 12. See id. 
 13. European Fed’n of Nat’l Ass’ns of Measurement, Testing and Analytical Labs., supra note 5, 
at 3. 
 14. Jonathan M. Barnett, Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with 
Profit Maximization?, 37 J. CORP. L. 475, 476 (2012). 
 15. When certifiers do not merely provide information in the form of an attestation but by doing 
so in effect can restrict and thereby control the access of the certified item to the market or to other 
facilities, they serve as “gatekeepers.”  See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third- 
Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 54-55 (1986) (discussing the pharmaceutical sector as 
an example).  For an extensive discussion on the concept of gatekeepers, see Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper 
Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers: A Proposal for a 
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for 
Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 916 (1998); see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding 
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323 (2007).  By lending their reputational capital, they enable 
other parties to rely on the attested trustworthiness or reliability of the requesting entity.  See JOHN C. 
COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-5 (2006).  
By being able to withhold the necessary cooperation or consent, they can prevent misconduct by the 
certified entity. See id. at 2.  The main focus of this Article, however, is not to examine whether, and if 
so, under which circumstances, certifiers become gatekeepers.  Instead, this contribution sheds light on 
the obligations of certifiers during the certification process. 
 16. See infra Parts III.B.1-3. 
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instruments.17  Investors, who in most cases do not have the capacity or time 
to examine and evaluate the quality of financial instruments or the 
creditworthiness of the issuer of such instruments, use ratings issued by 
CRAs to make investment decisions.18  Classification societies, including 
Lloyds Register or American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), are hired and paid 
for by the owner of the vessel that is to be classified.19  They issue a class 
certificate attesting that a vessel is built in accordance with so-called class 
rules.20  Important actors in the maritime industry rely on these certificates 
as an assurance that the classed vessel is likely to be reasonably suited for 
its intended use.21  This is known as the private function of classification 
societies.22 
From this private function, the role of classification societies expanded 
to cover public tasks.23  This is referred to as statutory certification.24  Flag 
States have the duty under international law to take appropriate measures 
for vessels flying their flag to ensure safety at sea.25  States often delegate 
executive powers to classification societies.26  Acting as Recognized 
Organizations (ROs), the latter become responsible for the implementation 
and enforcement of international maritime safety standards, thereby 
fulfilling a public role.27  A last example are product certifiers such as 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or TüV Rheinland.28 
 
 17. Eddy Wymeersch & Marc Kruithof, Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies 
under Belgian Law, 1 (Ghent Univ. Fin. Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2006-05, 2006). 
 18. See id.; see also ALINE DARBELLAY, REGULATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 38 (2013); 
COFFEE, supra note 15, at 1-6, 286. 
 19. NICOLAI LAGONI, THE LIABILITY OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES 43 (2007); see also Lloyd’s 
Register - improving safety, quality and performance, LOYD’S REGISTER (last visited Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://www.lr.org/en/; About Us, AM. BUREAU SHIPPING (last visited Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://ww2.eagle.org/en/about-us.html. 
 20. See LAGONI, supra note 19, at 43-44. 
 21. See Machale Miller, Liability of Classification Societies from the Perspective of United States 
Law, 22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 75, 77 (1997); see also LAGONI, supra note 19, at 6-7. 
 22. See LAGONI, supra note 19. 
 23. See LAGONI, supra note 19, at 50 (“If the private body acts under private law, a classification 
society may, for instance, carry out statutory surveys and award or renew certificates.  The territorial 
sovereignty of the port State is not affected by such private acts.  For this reason, most flag States have 
either authorised [sic] classification societies to undertake certain statutory surveys on their behalf or 
even granted a full authrisation [sic] to issue all necessary statutory certificates, whether the vessel is in 
its port of registry or not.  Classification societies are present in every major port world-wide or at least 
have a dense network of exclusive and non-exclusive surveyors.”). 
 24. See ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 44 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2006). 
 25. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 94, Dec. 10 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 26. See LAGONI, supra note 19, at 51 (“The flag State may also choose to assign these functions 
to a private legal subject, such as a classification society.”). 
 27. See Juan L. Pulido Begines, The EU Law on Classification Societies: Scope and Liability 
Issues, 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 489-90, 502 (2005); see also LAGONI, supra note 19, at 13-14; 
Anthony M. Antapassis, Liability of Classification Societies, 11.3 EJCL 1, 12-13 (2007), 
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These private bodies are sometimes involved in the certification process 
of medical devices in the European Union (EU).29  A manufacturer can only 
place medical devices on the European market when they meet several 
essential requirements.30  To that end, the manufacturer has to perform a 
conformity assessment procedure of the medical device.31  In some cases, 
this assessment needs to be carried out by an independent certifier known as 
a “notified body”.32  The body determines whether medical devices meet all 
the applicable essential requirements to get the necessary CE marking.33 
Scandals involving certifiers (for example, the 2008 financial crisis or 
the Erika and Prestige maritime disasters) illustrate that the latter do not 
always provide accurate and reliable certificates that correspond with the 
“true” or “actual” value of the certified item.34  Third parties might thus 
incur losses or suffer damage and injuries, despite the issuance of a 
certificate attesting that the item complied with the applicable 
requirements.35  Investors, for instance, incurred economic losses following 
the financial crisis, even though positive ratings were issued to structured 
financial products.36  Similarly, TüV Rheinland certified Poly Implant 
Prothèse (PIP) breast implants that later turned out to be defective due to the 
risk of ruptures.37  Hundreds of thousands of implants filled with sub-
standard silicone gel were distributed around the world thereby potentially 
 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20In%20Progress/Classification%20Societies/Antapass
is%20-%20Liability%20of%20Classification%20Societies%20EJCL%20Dec%202007.pdf. 
 28. About UL: What We Do, UL (last visited Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ul.com/aboutul/what-
we-do/; The Brand: TÜV Rheinland. Precisely Right., TÜV RHEINLAND (last visited Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.tuv.com/en/usa/about_us/group_us/the_brand_us/the_brand.html. 
 29. See Bernhard Lobmayr, An Assessment of the EU Approach to Medical Device Regulation 
against the Backdrop of the US System, 1 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 137, 142 (2010) (“Europe’s regulatory 
regime for medical devices contains self-regulatory elements in that the certification of a product is 
handled by the manufacturer in conjunction with a Notified Body.”). 
 30. See Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ L 169. 
 31. See Conformity Assessment, EUROPEAN COMM’N (last visited Oct 23. 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/building-blocks/conformity-assessment. 
 32. See 2016 O.J. (C 272) 75. 
 33. See Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ L 169. 
 34. See Brent J. Horton, Toward a More Perfect Substitute: How Pressure on the Issuers of 
Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities Can Improve the Accuracy of Ratings, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1905, 
1908-10 (addressing the question of how to make CRAs more accurate in information given to the 
investing public, especially in the context of mortgage-backed securities, which were the root cause of 
the 2008 financial crisis); Tito Drago, Prestige: the Most Costly Maritime Accident in History, INTER 
PRESS SERV. (Jul. 28, 2003), http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/prestige-the-most-costly-maritime-
accident-in-history/; Tom Mangold, The scandal of the Erika, BBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2000, 15:58 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/883110.stm. 
 35. See Horton, supra note 34, at 1906, 1909-10. 
 36. See id. at 1906. 
 37. Patrick Sawer & Josie Ensor, Faulty breast Implant Victims Forced to Repay Compensation, 
TELEGRAPH (July 2, 2015, 4:44 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11712771/Faulty-breast-implant-victims-
forced-to-repay-compensation.html. 
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causing physical harm to women who purchased them.38  The sinking of a 
vessel that has been classified by a major classification society can also 
cause financial losses to cargo-owners or result in environmental damage to 
coastal States.  Against this background, it is no surprise that third parties 
have, on several occasions, filed claims against certifiers in different 
jurisdictions to recover their losses.39 
Scholars have already examined specific elements that are of 
importance in those liability claims.40  For instance, the extent to which 
CRAs benefit from the freedom of speech defense41 or whether 
classification societies can rely on immunity from jurisdiction have been 
widely discussed.42  The scope of a certifier’s liability towards third parties 
and its influence on the accuracy of certificates has been given the 
necessary attention as well.43  The certification process as such, however, 
has not attracted much academic attention.  Nevertheless, an analysis of a 
certifier’s liability towards both requesting entities and third parties requires 
an understanding of their commitments during the certification process.  
Policymakers could then rely on this analysis to craft specific liability 
regimes for certifiers.  Certifiers have several contractual obligations under 
the certification agreement with requesting entities.44  They also need to  
 38. Id. 
 39. For credit rating agencies see Tolin v. Std. & Poor’s Fin. Servs., LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 714, 
716 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Abu Dhabi Commer. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 163 
(2009); Cal. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys. v. Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 643 (First Dist., 
Div. 3 2014); Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin. Servs. Pty Ltd, [No. 5] [2012] FCA 1200 
(Austl.), aff’d ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Reg’l Council [2014] FCAFC 65 (Court of Appeal) 
(Austl.).  For classification societies see Otto Candies, LLC v. Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp., 346 F.3d 530, 
532 (5th Cir. 2003); Reino de Espana, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 456; Marc Rich & CO A.G. v. Bishop Rock 
Marine Co. Ltd., [1996] AC 211.  For notified bodies see Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV 
Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:128; Court of First Instance Nürnberg-Fürth, 
September 25, 2013, 11 O 3900/13 and Court of Appeal Zweibrücken [OLG], January 30, 2014, 4 U 
66/13 (Ger.); TÜV Rheinland, Press Release, 07/02/2015 (“In France, the Aix-en-Provence Court of 
Appeal reversed a judgment handed down by the Toulon Commercial Court on November 14th, 2013 
against the notified body TÜV Rheinland in connection with breast implants of the French manufacturer 
Poly Implant Prothèse (“PIP”).  The Court of Appeal thus dismissed the claims brought by foreign 
distributors of PIP implants as well as over 3,000 persons who had joined the case.”). 
 40. See Horton, supra note 34, at 1906; See also Caleb Deats, Talk Isn’t Cheap: Does the First 
Amendment Protect Credit Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 100 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1818, 1818-19 (2010). 
 41. See Deats, supra note 40; see also Jonathan W. Heggen, Not Always the World’s Shortest 
Editorial: Why Credit-Rating-Agency Speech is Sometimes Professional Speech, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 
1750 (2011); Parisa Haghshenas, Obstacles to Credit Rating Agencies’ First Amendment Defense in 
Light of Abu Dhabi, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 452, 454 (2010). 
 42. See Jan De Bruyne, Liability of Classification Societies: Cases, Challenges and Future 
Perspectives, 45 J. MAR. L. & COM. 181, 221 (2014); LAGONI, supra note 19, at 50-55. 
 43. See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 339; see also Choi, supra note 15, at 918; Kraakman, 
supra note 15, at 54; Hamdani, supra note 15, at 58; Partnoy, supra note 15, at 491; COFFEE, supra note 
15 at 5. 
 44. See, e.g., General Conditions of Service, SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE SURVEILLANCE (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2017),  
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comply with requirements imposed by inter-, supra- or national law.45  The 
difference between these two sources—contract and legislation—is of 
course of importance regarding a certifier’s liability.  In this article, 
however, they are taken together to shed light on the global certification 
process.46  That is because a third-party certifier’s conduct during the 
certification process is determined by contractual provisions as well as legal 
requirements.  The interaction between these two sources becomes clear as 
contractual terms often contain broad provisions (for example, on a 
certifier’s independence) that are further specified in the applicable 
legislation (for example, on the avoidance of specific conflicts of interest).47  
Moreover, the applicable legislation often includes provisions that 
specifically refer to the contractual setting with the requesting entity to 
ensure that certifiers issue accurate and reliable certificates.48  Certification 
agreements need to be seen in light of these legal requirements.  Therefore, 
and for reasons of clarity and reader friendliness, contractual obligations 
and legal requirements are combined together to shed light on the 
certification process.  As such, when talking about a certifier’s obligations 
during the certification process, it includes the contractual commitments as 
well as the legal requirements. 
The certification process generally starts with a requesting entity 
purchasing a certificate for a particular item.49  To that end, requesting 
entities are required to provide the item that needs to be certified and/or any 
related information to the certifier.50  Based on this information, the certifier 
 
http://www.sgs.com/-/media/global/documents/technical-documents/legal-documents/sgs-legal-general-
conditions-of-services-a4-en-14-11.pdf?la=en. 
 45. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 50-51. 
 46. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 47. See 2009 O.J. (L 302) 3. 
 48. For instance, EU legislation stipulates that CRAs should in their “professional activity” focus 
on the issuing of ratings to avoid potential conflicts of interest.  Recital (22) Regulation 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies, OJ L 302.  CRAs have an important responsibility towards investors and issuers in 
ensuring they comply with Regulation 1060/2009 so that their “ratings are independent, objective and of 
adequate quality.”  Recital (32) Regulation 462/2013 amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies, OJ L 146.  The Regulation on Medical Devices stipulates that the position of notified bodies 
vis-à-vis manufacturers “should be strengthened” to ensure continuous compliance by manufacturers 
after receipt of the original certification.  (Recital (52) Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 
90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, OJ L 117). 
 49. See LAGONI, supra note 19, at 43 (discussing process of contractual certification agreements 
between customers—typically shipyards—and classification societies, whereby the customer requests to 
have a vessel classified); see John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit 
Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 109, 116 (2009) (“Ratings typically are requested and paid for by the issuer or 
originator of the financial instrument in question, and are made available to the public for free.”). 
 50. Moody’s, for instance, will not issue a rating without all information necessary to calculate 
the initial rating. MOODY’S INV’RS SERV., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 27 (2017).  The 
6
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subsequently conducts the certification process.51  Certifiers have different 
obligations during the certification process.52  These obligations can be 
framed around two axes.  The combination of both axes provides a better 
insight regarding the obligations of certifiers during the certification process 
and, as a consequence, the latter’s potential liability as well.  The first axis 
deals with the stages during the certification process and the certifier’s 
corresponding obligations.53  There are three stages in the certification 
process: obligations that arise before the certificate is issued (pre-issuance 
obligations), the issuance of an independent certificate, and obligations that 
come into existence once the certificate is issued (post-issuance 
obligations).54  The second axis relates to the nature of the certifier’s 
obligations in each of these stages.55  Whether there will be a ground for 
liability depends on the nature of the certifier’s obligations.56  In this regard, 
several jurisdictions (explicitly or implicitly) make the distinction between 
the obligation of certifiers to produce or achieve a specific anticipated and 
contractual agreed result on the one hand (so-called obligation de résultat) 
and the obligation to apply the normally required diligence, reasonable care, 
and skill on the other hand (so-called obligation de moyen).57 
 
requirement to provide information also exists under the agreement with classification societies.  
Shipbuilders initiate the certification process by submitting a request for classification to the society.  
They provide the plans, related technical descriptions and data concerning the vessel for approval to the 
classification society. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 43-46.  The duty to give information is also included in 
certification contracts with product certifiers.  The conditions for certification services of product 
certifier SGS stipulate that the requesting entity has to make available or accessible product samples, 
information, records, documentation and facilities.  See, e.g., Terms and Conditions - General 
Conditions for Certification Services, SGS (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (art. 4), www.sgs.com/en/Terms-
and-Conditions/General-Conditions-for-Certification-Services-English.aspx. 
 51. See, e.g., LAGONI, supra note 19, at 43- 44 (requiring ship owners to submit the vessel’s 
blueprints to the classification society). 
 52. See, e.g., LAGONI, supra note 19, at 46-49 (discussing the various contractual obligations of 
classification societies). 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. See infra  Parts II-IV. 
 55. See infra  Parts II-IV. 
 56. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 57. In Belgium and France, this is known as the difference between an obligation de résultat and 
an obligation de moyen.  Certifiers will violate an obligation de résultat whenever the promised result 
has not been reached, except when the certifier proves that this failure is due to impossibility or force 
majeure.  The requesting entity will only have to establish that the certifier did not achieve the 
contractually promised result(s).  A violation of an obligation de moyen presupposes that the certifier did 
not apply the required care and skill.  If the certification contract is qualified as obligation de moyen, the 
certifier will only be liable if the requesting entity shows that the former has been negligent and did not 
act as a reasonable certifier placed in the same circumstances.  See WALTER VAN GERVEN & SOFIE 
COVEMAEKER, VERBINTENISSENRECHT 32-33 (2006); Leentje Van Valckenborgh, De kwalificatie van 
een verbintenis als resultaats-of middelenverbintenis, 5 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH BURGERLIJK 
RECHT 222, 222-29 (2011); Wymeersch & Kruithof, supra note 17, at 17-18; ALAIN BÉNABENT, DROIT 
DES OBLIGATIONS 295-96 (13th ed. 2012).  In England, strict contractual duties imply that, except in 
cases of a force majeure clause in the contract, liability is independent of fault.  However, in a contract 
for the supply of a service where the supplier is acting in the course of a business, there is an implied 
7
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Each of the three stages in the certification process leads to different 
obligations for certifiers.  During a first stage, they have to verify and 
examine the item or related information provided by the requesting entity.58  
This is an obligation de moyen.59  Thus, there will be a ground of liability if 
the certifier did not carefully perform the assessment of the item or related 
information that needs to be certified.60  Based on this assessment, certifiers 
subsequently issue an independent certificate during the second stage of the 
process.61  The issuance of an independent certificate is an obligation de 
 
term that the supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill.  The Act stipulates that 
any rule of law might impose a duty on the supplier that is stricter than the one imposed under Section 
13.  Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982, ch. 29, §§ 13, 16 (amended 1994).  The type of contract 
determines whether the liability of the party breaching the contract will be strict or based on fault.  For 
instance, when the contract is one for the supply of components or goods, liability is generally strict.  
The contractor’s duty under a contract of services, on the other hand, is often one of care only. See, e.g., 
BHP Petroleum Ltd v. British Steel plc (2000), 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 277, 287( discussing drafting issues and 
limiting liability clauses).  The general rule is that contracts under which services are rendered by 
professionals (e.g. accountants or lawyers) only impose a duty of care.  The professional party does not 
guarantee to produce a specific result but only undertakes to perform the services with reasonable care 
and skill. EDWIN PEEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 837 (13th ed. 2011).  In Germany, the distinction is 
made between the contract of services or employment. Dienstvertrag reg’d in §§ 611-30 BGB, and the 
contract of work Werkvertrag reg’d in § 631 BGB.  A contract for service does not contain an obligation 
to achieve a specific result. Rather, under contracts to provide services, the party providing the services 
is only required to perform the service lege artis but does not promise a particular result.  The party 
performing the service is only bound to perform this service using reasonable care and skill without 
achieving the specific result.  The contract of work contains the duty for a party to achieve a specific 
result. BASIL S. MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH, & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN LAW OF 
CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 153-56 (2d ed. 2006); BASIL S. MARKESINIS, WERNER LORENZ 
& GERHARD DANNEMANN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 
40 (1997).  In the United States, “every first-year law student learns [that] contract liability is absolute 
liability-that is to say, liability not based on fault. In the law of contracts, trying is not enough.” E. Allan 
Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).  In this regard, Hillman relies on different judicial opinions, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and doctrinal contributions to conclude that reasons for failing to perform a 
contract, whether willful, negligent or unavoidable “have little or no bearing in determining contract 
liability”.  Contract liability is strict, which means that the reasons for nonperformance are irrelevant in 
determining the injured party’s rights.  Robert A. Hillman, The Importance of Fault in Contract Law, 
CORNELL LAW FACULTY WORKING PAPERS. PAPER 12-34, (Aug. 2012) Eric Posner, Fault in American 
Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1431  (2009)); see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract 
Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2009)).  However, a duty of best efforts for the certifier can 
arise when the contractual terms explicitly limit the certifier’s undertaking to a duty of best efforts.  The 
language used in contracts that require the promisor to achieve a specific result can be interpreted as only 
imposing a duty of best efforts.  This can be the case for contracts of service.  See Farnsworth, supra 
note 57, at 4-5.  As such, strict liability is a “very narrow view of the nature of a contract promise.  At 
minimum, it ignores the many contracts that explicitly or implicitly import standards of care, such as 
best efforts, due care, and good faith.”  See Hillman, supra note 57, at 8. 
 58. See infra Section II. 
 59. See Olivier Moreteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: The Experience of 
the French Civil Code, 20 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 273, 285 (1995) (the third-party certifiers 
undertakes only a duty of care at this stage and “is under no obligation to reach any particular 
outcome.”). 
 60. See infra Section II. 
 61. See, e.g., LAGONI, supra note 19, at 43, 44 (in the context of classification societies). 
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résultat.62  The certifier will, therefore, violate this obligation if it did not 
remain independent towards the requesting entity, regardless of the question 
whether it acted carefully.63  Certifiers also have several post-issuance 
obligations during the third stage of the certification process.64  The most 
important obligation during this last stage concerns monitoring and 
surveillance tasks.65  These can be qualified as obligations de moyen, which 
means the certifier has to perform these duties carefully.66  A certifier does 
not act wrongfully if it carefully performed these duties even if the 
certificate has not been withdrawn, downgraded, or adapted otherwise.67  
The combination of both axes provides a graphical illustration of the 
obligations of certifiers during the certification process.  This could be taken 
into account by policymakers when crafting liability regimes.68 
II. FIRST STAGE OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS: ‘PRE-ISSUANCE’ 
OBLIGATIONS 
Certifiers have several pre-issuance obligations during the first stage of 
the certification process.69  They are of course required to perform the 
analysis of the item or related information that needs certification.70  This 
obligation to perform the analysis has little to do with how the analysis is 
actually conducted.71  The obligation to perform the analysis within the 
agreed time framework qualifies as obligation de résultat.72  Thus, there 
might be grounds for a certifier’s liability when it did not perform the 
 
 62. See Moreteau, supra note 59 (it is at this stage that the third-party certifier must actually 
perform what was promised). 
 63. See infra Section III. 
 64. See infra Section IV. 
 65. See LAGONI, supra note 19, at 47 (describing classification societies’ monitoring obligations). 
 66. See Moreteau, supra note 59, at 285. 
 67. See infra Section IV. 
 68. As Mavrommati rightly underlines, “the gatekeeping problem is not confined to the US 
market and it certainly is an issue that concerns all countries around the world, including Europe.” Sandy 
Mavrommati, The Dynamics of Gatekeepers, Corporate Culture and Whistle Blowers, 1 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE L. REV. 385, 396 (2005).  Therefore, a study on the obligations of certifiers during the 
certification process from not only a US legal perspective but also including other jurisdictions is 
relevant.  This article does not give a country-by-country overview with regard to the obligations of 
certifiers. Instead, and surely not wanting to be accused of legal tourism, the legal context of the 
different jurisdictions where their liability has already been at stake is examined.  In other words, an 
eclectic research methodology is used.  The article is based on theoretical arguments and ideas coming 
from different jurisdictions without, however, always examining every jurisdiction thoroughly. See id. 
 69. See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 327-28 (“Most gatekeepers are paid for their services by 
the enterprises that retain them; all bear stated duties whose breach exposes them to legal liability.”). 
 70. See U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 3rd Party Conformity Assessment, AM. NAT’L 
STANDARDS INSTIT. (last visited Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/3party_conformity_assessment.aspx 
[hereinafter 3rd Party Assement]. 
 71. See Moreteau, supra note 59. 
 72. See id. 
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analysis or failed to do so on time, regardless of the level of care it 
applied.73 
More important, certifiers have to examine the item or related 
information provided by the requesting entity.74  Based on this analysis, 
they give the certificate.75  The way in which certifiers have to perform this 
analysis can be determined by the certification contracts (e.g. for CRAs), 
codes of practice or terms, and conditions (e.g. for product certifiers and 
classification societies) or EU and national law (e.g. for CRAs and notified 
bodies).76  A closer look at these sources shows certifiers are bound by an 
obligation de moyen when doing the analysis to determine the certificate.77  
Besides (A) general reasons pointing into that direction,78 (B) particular 
attention is given to each individual certifier, namely credit rating 
agencies,79 (C) classification societies,80 and (D) product certifiers and 
notified bodies.81 
A. General Considerations on the Certifier’s Obligations During the 
First Stage 
The issuance of the certificate is the result of tests and inspections 
performed by someone regarding the item that has to be certified.82  Class 
surveyors, financial analysts, or inspectors are involved in the certification 
process and determine whether and which certificate can be issued.83  As 
such, the certification process remains the result of human appreciations and 
calculations.84  Considering that mistakes are a part of being human, 
certifiers should not be liable only because the certificate does not 
correspond with the “real” or “true” value of the certified item.  This also 
corresponds with decisions in several jurisdictions or legislation according 
 
 73. Tuba Akçura Karaman, Comparative Study on the Liability of Classification Societies to 
Third Party Purchasers with Reference to Turkish, Swiss, German and US Law, 42 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
125, 128-29 (2011); JÜRGEN BASEDOW & WOLFGANG WURMNEST, THIRD-PARTY LIABILITYOF 
CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 36 (2005). 
 74. 3rd Party Assessment, supra note 70. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 77. See supra Section I; see infra Section II.B.1. 
 78. See infra Section II.A. 
 79. See infra Section II.B. 
 80. See infra Section II.C. 
 81. See infra Section II.D. 
 82. 3rd Party Assessment, supra note 70. 
 83. See, e.g., Gilles, The different roles of Maritime Inspectors, Surveyors and Auditors, MEIJ 
DESIGN & SURVEY (Jan. 15, 2005), https://maritime-mea.com/blog/2015/01/15/difference-between-
maritime-inspectors-surveyors-auditors/. 
 84. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT i (June 2017), 
www.moodys.com/uploadpage/Mco%20Documents/Documents_professional_conduct.pdf (noting the 
possibility of human error). 
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to which other professional providers of information or services, such as 
lawyers,85 parties issuing the electronic identification meanscertifiers of 
electric signatures,86 or medical practitioners,87 are only bound to carefully 
perform their services, without having to achieve or guarantee a particular 
result.  There is no reason why this should be any different for certifiers 
who provide professional certification services.  The wording used in 
Article 1:107 of the Principles of European Law on Service Contracts points 
towards a similar direction.88  It stipulates that the provider of services has 
to perform the service “with the care and skill that a reasonable service 
provider would exercise under the circumstances”.89  “If the service 
provider professes a higher standard of care and skill the provider must 
exercise that care and skill.”90  “If the service provider is, or purports to be, 
a member of a group of professional service providers for which standards 
exist that have been set by a relevant authority or by that group itself, the 
service provider must exercise the care and skill expressed in these 
standards.”91  
 85. See, e.g., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Mons, May 14, 2009, REVUE DE 
JURISPRUDENCE DE LIÈGE, MONS BRUXELLES [JLMB] 2010, 1423 (Belg.); Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court 
of Appeal] Liège, Oct. 14, 2009, REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE DE LIÈGE, MONS BRUXELLES [JLMB] 2010, 
1434 (Belg.); PEEL, supra note 57, at 837 (discussing Clark. V. Kirby-Smith [1964] Ch. 506 (Eng.)); Rb. 
Utrecht 28 januari 2009, NJF 2009, 198 m.nt. (/The Priv. Ltd. Liab. Co.) (Neth.). 
 86. “Electronic identification means’ refers to a material and/or immaterial unit containing person 
identification data and which is used for authentication for an online service.”  Article 3(2) Regulation 
(EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC, OJ L 257.  In this regard, Article 11, 2. of Regulation 910/2014 stipulates that the “party 
issuing the electronic identification means is liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any 
natural or legal person due to a failure to comply with the obligation referred to in point (e) of Article 7 
in a cross-border transaction”. 
 87. See, e.g., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Liège, Oct. 18, 2012, UN REVIREMENT DE 
JURISPRUDENCE DES JURIDICTIONS LIÈGEOISES, 2013, 1148 (Belg.); Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of 
Appeal] Liège, Nov. 15, 2012, *3, 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/JuridatSearchCombined/printDecision.jsp (Belg.); Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Versailles, 1e ch., Mar. 28, 1996, D. 1996, 138 (Fr.); Eyre v. Measday [1986] 
All. E.R. 488 *3 (Eng.); Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644, 658, 678, 685 (Eng.).  In Germany, things 
seem less clear. See TADE M. SPRANGER, MEDICAL LAW IN GERMANY 79-80 (2011).  Spranger 
concludes that it has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether a violation of an agreement 
occurred. Id. at 80.  However, he argues that it seems clear that the physician does not owe the success of 
convalescence in normal medical treatments and, therefore, cannot be held responsible if the treatment is 
carried out according to the current state of medical arts without success. Id. at 79.  In his study, Stauch 
also concludes that a violation of the medical contract does not arise merely because the result is not 
achieved. MARC STAUCH, THE LAW OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (2008).  Instead, German courts have qualified the medical contract as a 
Dienstvertrag, which obliges the doctor to exercise due skill and care without warranting a particular 
result. Id. 
 88. MAURITS BARENDRECHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW: SERVICE CONTRACTS 216 
(2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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There are also several other elements illustrating that certifiers are 
bound by an obligation de moyen when conducting the analysis to 
determine the related certificate.92  One element, to qualify an obligation as 
an obligation de moyen, is related to uncertainty as to whether the exercise 
of reasonable care will actually lead to a specific anticipated result.93  If a 
particular result remains unsure despite applying reasonable efforts to 
achieve it, the obligation more likely qualifies as an obligation de moyen.94  
This seems to be the case for certifiers, as there is no guarantee that the 
certified item will ever default, even when the certifiers carefully performed 
the analysis.95  A comparison can, to a certain extent, be made with doctors 
who are bound by an obligation de moyen.  For instance, they will not face 
liability in Belgium merely because the patient did not heal.96  Liability will 
be imposed to the extent that the doctor did not act as a prudent and careful 
doctor placed in similar circumstances.97 
Another element, namely the involvement of the requesting entity in the 
certification procedure, might also be an indication that it concerns an 
obligation de moyen.98  An active role of the requesting entities can be an 
indication that a third-party certifier is only bound by an obligation de 
moyen.99  It remains difficult to impose an obligation de résultat on the 
third-party certifier if the latter is not solely responsible for the outcome of 
the first stage in the certification process.100  The requesting entity has to 
provide the necessary information to the certifier.101  Consequently, a 
certifier is only able to issue a reliable and accurate certificate to the extent 
that information given by the requesting entity is correct.102  Moreover, the 
requesting entity has to cooperate with the certifier during the first stage of 
the certification process.103  The PIP case illustrates the importance of 
 
 92. See Christian Rothhahn, Liability Outsourcer Under Obligation de Resultat, BIRD & BIRD 
(Sept. 6, 2006), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2006/liability-outsourcer-under-obligation-
de-resultat (illustrating that a court must determine if a contract is either obligation of result or obligation 
of means). 
 93. Id. 
 94. GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL: LES CONDITIONS 
GENERALES DE LA RESPONABILITE 460-461 (Jacques Ghestin ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
 95. See infra Section III. 
 96. HERMAN NYS, MEDICAL LAW IN BELGIUM 81 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2010). 
 97. Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Liège, Oct. 18, 2012, UN REVIREMENT DE 
JURISPRUDENCE DES JURIDICTIONS LIÈGEOISES, 2013, 1148 (Belg.). 
 98. See, e.g., Viney & Jourdain, supra note 94, at 461. 
 99. See, e.g., id. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 460-61 (discussing doctors and lawyer as examples of the types of contracts). 
 101. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 27 (discussing what is 
necessary for an issuance of a credit rating and what is needed to make a proper assessment). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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giving accurate information as well as the consequences of not doing so.104  
Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) was a French company that produced breast 
implants.105  As of 2001, French law obliged manufacturers of breast 
implants to use one specific type of medical silicone gel in their products.106  
However, PIP did not comply with this explicit requirement.107  It 
“developed an elaborate scheme of deceit and continued to use sub-standard 
industrial silicone gel” implants to cut costs.108  The impact of the PIP’s 
fraud on the manufacturing process was quite disparate.109  Whereas some 
implants contained the required medical silicone gel, others held a mixture 
of medical and industrial silicone gel or only industrial silicone gel.110  
Therefore, the control on the quality and certification of the breast implants 
by the certifier was made extremely difficult.111  Such events show that it 
might take things too far to impose an obligation de résultat on certifiers, as 
they do not always have control over the item that needs certification or the 
behavior of the requesting entities.112 
B. Obligations of Credit Rating Agencies Before Issuing the 
Certificate 
Besides general reasons pointing towards an obligation de moyen, 
recourse can also be taken in specific situations where each certifier can 
underpin that conclusion.113  A credit rating agency, for instance, grounds its 
decision to issue a rating on financial information provided by the issuer or 
information that is publically available.114  CRAs have two major 
obligations during the first stage of the certification process.115  On the one 
hand, they have to analyze the information with regard to the issuer’s 
financial position.116  On the other hand, they need to use rigorous, 
systematic, and continuous methodologies to determine the rating.117 
 
 104. Barend van Leeuwen, PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods and Market 
Surveillance by Notified Bodies, 5 EUR. J. RISK REG. 338, 339 (2014). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Leeuwen, supra note 104. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 339-40; Baylie M. Fry, A Reasoned Proposition to a Perilous Problem: Creating a 
Government Agency to Remedy the Emphatic Failure of Notified Bodies in the Medical Device Industry, 
22 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 161, 169-70 (2014). 
 113. See MCGRAW HILL FINANCIAL, STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, CODE OF CONDUCT 
8, §7.1 (2015), www.maalot.co.il/publications/PAR20160316144028.pdf. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See infra Section II.B.1-2. 
 116. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 117. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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1. Analysis of Information Made Available to the CRA 
The process of coming to the actual rating can be quite complex and 
challenging.118  Article 8.2. of the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies 
stipulates that a CRA has to “adopt, implement and enforce adequate 
measures to ensure that the credit ratings it issues are based on a thorough 
analysis of all information that is available to it and that is relevant to its 
analysis according to its rating methodologies.”119  The 2008 IOSCO Code 
of Conduct Fundamental for CRAs,120 as well as the individual codes of 
conduct adopted by the CRAs, use similar wording.121  The codes of 
conduct further specify that the rating analysis and any rating action have to 
be based upon the criteria, processes, and methodologies established by 
CRAs.122 
Arguably, the requirement that a CRA has to adopt, implement, and 
enforce adequate measures to ensure that the ratings are based on a 
thorough analysis of all available and relevant information according to its 
methodologies is an obligation de moyen.  CRAs remain free to determine 
whether the adopted measures are adequate and the analysis is conducted 
thoroughly.  That is because it would be difficult to establish when exactly 
the adopted measures would be adequate or if the analysis is thorough.  As 
such, CRAs will apply reasonable care and skill when adopting adequate 
measures and conducting a thorough analysis.  The purpose of Article 8.2. is 
(merely) to guarantee that ratings are issued after an analysis of relevant and 
available information, which the CRA has to consider according to its own 
methodologies.  Therefore, CRAs only have to analyze information that is 
deemed relevant.  Basically, CRAs are free to decide which information is 
relevant and only have to mention the information they will use in their 
methodologies.  The analysis needs to be based on the available 
information.  CRAs can ground their decision to issue a rating on the 
(financial) information provided by the issuer.  Thus, CRAs are not 
expected to actively look for all existing information, and in case the issuer 
does not provide sufficient information, they are only required to examine 
 
 118. See, e.g., 2009 O.J. (L 302) 12; TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., CODE OF 
CONDUCT FUNDAMENTAL FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 4, § 1.1 (May 2008), 
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, supra 
note 113, at 3, § 1.4; FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 4, §§ 2.1A, 2.1.3. (Aug. 2014), 
www.fitchratings.com/web_content/credit_policy/code_of_conduct.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO]. 
 119. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 12-13. 
 120. TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118. 
 121. STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, supra note 113, at 3, § 1.4. 
 122. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 4, §§ 2.1A, 2.1.3. 
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public information on the issuer.  Such wording might be difficult to match 
with an obligation de résultat.123 
Article 8.2. of the EU Regulation on CRAs further stipulates that CRAs 
have to adopt all necessary measures so that the information used when 
assigning a rating is “of sufficient quality and from reliable sources.”124  At 
first sight, this seems an obligation de résultat considering that CRAs are 
required to use “all necessary” measures.125  The CRA needs to refrain from 
issuing a rating if there is a “lack of reliable data or [when] the complexity 
of the structure of a new type of financial instrument or the quality of 
information available is not satisfactory or raises serious questions as to 
whether a credit rating agency can provide a credible credit rating.”126  Such 
an interpretation also follows from the decision by the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California in Anschutz v. Merrill Lynch.127  
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s acknowledged the importance to use 
information of sufficient quality and from accurate and reliable sources.128  
Both CRAs claimed “[they] would exercise [their] editorial discretion and 
[would] either refrain from publishing the opinion or withdraw an 
outstanding credit rating” if they would only possess inadequate 
information.129  The IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals, however, is 
less clear-cut when stipulating that “[a] CRA should [only] adopt reasonable 
measures so that the information . . . is of sufficient quality to support a 
credible rating.”130  A similar wording is used in the rating agreements and 
the individual codes of conduct adopted by CRAs.131  As such, there seems 
a discrepancy between the wording in the Regulation on CRAs on the one 
hand (using “all necessary measures”) and rating agreements, or the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct Fundamentals (using ‘reasonable measures’) on the other 
hand.132  There are, nonetheless, two arguments why CRAs should only be 
bound by an obligation de moyen.  This implies that CRAs only have to 
apply reasonable and not all measures to ensure the information they use to 
determine a rating is of sufficient quality and from reliable sources. 
First, contractual terms often stipulate that CRAs do not guarantee that 
the information they receive from the issuer is accurate, complete, correct,  
 123. RAQUEL GARCÍA ALCUBILLA & JAVIER RUIZ DEL POZO, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES ON THE 
WATCH LIST: ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN REGULATION 190 (1ST ed. 2012). 
 124. See 2009 O.J. (L 302) 13. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See 2009 O.J. (L 302) 4, 28 (citation omitted). 
 127. See 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (citation omitted). 
 130. See TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118, at 5, § 1.7. 
 131. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 4, §§ 2.1A, 2.1.7. 
 132. See TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118, at 5, § 1.7; see 2009 
O.J. (L 302) 13. 
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or comprehensive.133  Some credit ratings agreements also state that CRAs 
do not have a duty of due diligence or independent verification of the 
information given by the issuer.134  Fitch’s Code of Conduct is clear in this 
regard when stipulating the CRA relies on the issuer for the accuracy of 
information and documents to determine the latter’s creditworthiness.135  
Fitch does not fully audit or verify all such information and does not take 
the responsibility for the appropriateness of the information provided.136  
The codes of conduct of the other individual CRAs contain similar 
wording.137  Moody’s, for instance, “is not an auditor and cannot . . . 
independently verify or validate information received in the rating 
process.”138  “Standard & Poor’s relies on the issuer, its accountants, 
counsel, advisors, and other experts for the accuracy, completeness, and 
timeliness of the information submitted in connection with [the] rating.”139  
Such provisions seem difficult to align with the obligation of CRAs to adopt 
“all necessary” measures to safeguard that the information is of sufficient 
quality and from reliable sources.140  Therefore, it seems more realistic that 
CRAs, within the confines of the provisions in contracts or code of 
conducts, only have to adopt “reasonable measures”.141 
Second, case law in different jurisdictions can be relied upon to show 
that CRAs only have to apply reasonable measures to safeguard that 
information used when assigning a rating is of sufficient quality and from 
reliable sources.142  The Australian Bathurst case is of particular importance 
 
 133. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 4, §§ 2.1A, 2.1.7 (“If the rating or a rating 
outlook involves a type of structured financial product presenting limited historical data (such as an 
innovative financial vehicle), Fitch shall disclose, clearly and in prominent place, such limitation.”). 
 134. See in this regard also 2009 O.J. (L 302) 3 (“The level of detail concerning the disclosure of 
information concerning models should be such as to give adequate information to the users of credit 
ratings in order to perform their own due diligence when assessing whether to rely or not on those credit 
ratings.”). 
 135. See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 4, §§ 2.1A, 2.1.7. 
 136. See, e.g., id. (“In issuing and maintaining its ratings or rating outlooks, Fitch relies on factual 
information it receives from issuers and underwriters and from other sources Fitch believes to be 
credible.  Fitch conducts a reasonable investigation of the factual information relied upon by it in 
accordance with its ratings methodology, and obtains reasonable verification of that information from 
independent sources, to the extent such sources are available for a given security or in a given 
jurisdiction . . . Users of Fitch’s ratings should understand that neither an enhanced factual investigation 
nor any third-party verification can ensure that all of the information Fitch relies on in connection with a 
rating will be accurate and complete.”). 
 137. See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT i; STANDARD & 
POOR’S RATING SERVICES, supra note 113, at 8 §7.1. 
 138. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 84. 
 139. STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, supra note 113, at 8, §7.1. 
 140. See 2009 O.J. (L 302) 13. 
 141. ALCUBILLA & DEL POZO, supra note 123, at 190. 
 142. See, e.g., Bathurst, (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200, at ¶ 2979 (Austl.); Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court 
of Appeal] Brussel, Dec. 8, 2004, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht-Revue de droit commercial 
belge [TBH-RDC] 2006, 135 (Belg.). 
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in this regard.  The judge held that S&P violated its duty of care towards 
investors.  The rating was not based on reasonable grounds and issued 
without reasonable care and skill.143  One reason why the CRA did not act 
with reasonable care and skill was because it did not apply reasonable 
measures to ensure that information was of sufficient quality and from 
reliable sources.  The CRA did not develop its own model for rating the 
securities but instead relied on the model created by the issuer.  S&P also 
did not consider the model risk when assigning the rating.144  In addition, 
S&P adopted a 15% volatility figure which had been provided by ABN 
Amro.  However, S&P could have easily calculated the volatility and would 
then have realized that the correct figure was around 28%.  In essence, S&P 
used a number of inputs that were incorrect to calculate the rating.  This 
could have been prevented if the CRA had relied on information of 
sufficient quality and from accurate and reliable sources and not only on 
information given by the issuer ABN Amro.145  Reference can also be made 
to a Belgian case dealing with the liability of information providers.146  The 
Court of Appeal in Brussels upheld a lower court decision according to 
which the issuance of incorrect commercial information does not ipso facto 
lead to the liability of the information provider147.  Rather, there must be 
“un manque de prudence ou de diligence dans la recherche ou dans la 
communication de l’information” (own translation: there needs to be a lack 
of prudence or diligence in the research or communication of the 
information).148  Such wording corresponds with the duty to apply 
reasonable measures instead of displaying all necessary measures to 
safeguard that the information is of sufficient quality and from reliable 
sources.149 
2. Using Rigorous, Systematic and Continuous Rating 
Methodologies 
Once all the information is gathered, CRAs proceed with the calculation 
of the rating based on this information.150  Article 8.3. of the EU Regulation 
on CRAs, the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals,151 and the individual 
 
 143. See id. at 2437, 2820-2836, 2979 & 3105 (Austl.).  See Jan De Bruyne, Liability of Credit 
Rating Agencies: Regulatory Changes and Tendencies in Case Law Following the Financial Crisis, 
27(3) I.C.C.L.R. 89 (2016). 
 144. Id. at 2547, 2555-2590. 
 145. See Bathurst, (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200, at ¶¶ 2547, 2611-69 (Austl.). 
 146. See Cours d’Appel Brussel, Dec. 8, 2004, at 135 (Belg.). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Cours d’Appel Brussel, Dec. 8, 2004, at 135 (Belg.). 
 150. See infra Section III. 
 151. TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118, at 4, § 1.2. 
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codes of conduct adopted by the CRAs152 stipulate CRAs have to use 
rigorous, systematic, and continuous rating methodologies.  This at first 
sight looks similar to an obligation de résultat.153  The European 
Commission, for instance, adopted legislation which clearly defines when 
methodologies are considered rigorous,154 systematic,155 continuous,156 and 
based on historical experience.157  The enactment of such legislation might 
be an indication that CRAs are bound by an obligation de résultat as there 
are clear standards and requirements that CRAs have to follow.158  
Consequently, there can be a ground for liability once CRAs do not meet 
these standards, regardless of the efforts they made to achieve them.  
Similar conclusions are reached in some countries where the liability of 
CRAs has already been subject of academic debate.  In Germany, for 
example, some qualify a rating agreement as a contract for work 
(Werkvertrag).  The contract for work contains a duty for a party to achieve 
a specific result.  The use of rigorous, systematic, and continuous 
methodologies might be such a specific result.159 
At the same time, however, there are two more important reasons why 
CRAs are actually bound by an obligation de moyen.160  There will only be 
grounds for liability when CRAs  negligently use rigorous, systematic, and 
 
 152. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 84, at 8. 
 153. Moreteau, supra note 59. 
 154. See 2012 O.J. (L 140) 15 (a rigorous methodology (1) “contain[s] clear and robust controls 
and processes for their developments and related approvals that allow suitable challenge;” (2) 
“incorporate[s] all driving factors deemed relevant in determining [the] creditworthiness of a rated entity 
or a financial instrument [and is] supported by statistical, historical experience or evidence;” (3) 
“consider[s] the modelled relationship between rated entities or financial instruments of the same risk 
factor and risk factors to which the credit rating methodologies are sensitive;” and (4) “incorporate[s] 
reliable, relevant[,] and quality related analytical models, key credit rating assumptions and criteria 
where these are in place.”). 
 155. See id. (the methodology is considered systematic if (1) it can be “applied systematically in 
the formulation of all ratings in a given asset class or market segment unless there is an objective reason 
for diverging from it[;]” and (2) if it “is capable of promptly incorporating the findings from any review 
of its appropriateness.”). 
 156. See id. (the methodology is continuous if it is “designed and implemented in such a way that 
enables [it] to:” (1) “be used unless there is an objective reason for the rating methodology to change or 
be discontinued;” (2) “be capable of promptly incorporating any finding from ongoing monitoring or a 
review, in particular where changes in structural macroeconomic or financial market conditions would 
be capable of affecting credit ratings produced by that methodology;” and (3) “compare ratings across 
different asset classes.”). 
 157. See 2012 O.J. (L 140) 16 (the rating methodology will be “subject to validation based on 
historical experience including back testing” if it is, for example, “supported by quantitative evidence of 
the discriminatory power of the credit rating methodology.”). 
 158. See 2012 O.J. (L 140) 15, 16. 
 159. Alessandro Scarso, The Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in a Comparative Perspective, 4 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW 163, 166, n.10, (2013) (with references to academic scholarship). 
 160. See Norbert Gaillard, La Responsabilité Éthique des Agencies de Notation, 124 
TRANSVERSALITÉS, 53, 66-67 (2012). 
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continuous methodologies.161  The question whether or not methodologies 
are rigorous, systematic, and continuous is determined by the behavior of 
the CRAs.162  Put differently, the conduct of CRAs makes rating 
methodologies unacceptable. 
First, the judge in the Bathurst case held that the CRA did not use 
rigorous, systematic, and continuous methodologies because of the lack of 
reasonable grounds to assign the rating.  The rating was not the result of the 
CRA’s reasonable care and skill.163  S&P did not develop its own model for 
rating CPDOs, but instead, relied on the model created by ABN Amro.  The 
CRA also did not give any consideration to the model risk when assigning 
the credit rating.164  S&P adopted a 15% volatility figure which had been 
provided by ABN Amro.  There was no evidence S&P checked the 15% 
volatility figure itself.  Nonetheless, S&P could have easily calculated the 
volatility and would then have realized the correct figure was around 28%.  
A reasonable and prudent CRA would have done its own calculations and 
surely not have adopted a volatility figure of 15%.165  The notes were a 
newly created product issued in a new market.  Consequently, there was no 
reliable historical data concerning the intended performance of the notes.  
S&P therefore had to conduct a particularly rigorous and conservative 
assessment of the available data.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs that 
S&P did not undertake such an analysis.  Rather, the CRA “adopted inputs 
for its model advocated by ABN Amro for which there was no reasonable 
historical or statistical basis.”166 
The second reason concerns the actual process of calculating the rating, 
which in fine remains the result of “une appréciation humaine”.167  This also 
corresponds with the wording used in the EU Regulation on CRAs, which 
stipulates that the business of rating involves a degree of assessment of 
complex economic factors.168  CRAs have a degree of discretion to 
determine whether their methodologies are rigorous, systematic, and 
continuous.169  The use of different methodologies can lead to different  
 161. See 2012 O.J. (L 140) 15, 16. 
 162. See 2012 O.J. (L 140) 15 (“When examining the compliance of credit rating agencies with 
the provision of Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 ESMA shall use all information relevant 
to assess the process of developing, approving, using and reviewing credit rating methodologies.”). 
 163. Id. at 1157-67 ¶¶ 2814-36; ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCA 
65 (November 5, 2012) ¶¶ 12, 503, 722 (Austl.) 
 164. Id. at ¶¶ 2547, 2555-89. 
 165. Bathurst, [2012] FCA 1200, at ¶ 2611-69. 
 166. Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 5 (05 
November 2012) 1200, paragraphs 2423 & 2836 (Austl); ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional 
Council [2014] FCAFC 65 (06 June 2014) paragraphs 12, 566-722 (Austl). 
 167. Edith Weemaels, La Responsabilité des Agences de Notation des Sociétés Responsables 
Comme les Autres?, N 7069 PRIX DE LA REVUE PRATIQUE DES SOCIÉTÉS 123, 154 (2011). 
 168. 2013 O.J. (L 146) 8. 
 169. 2013 O.J. (L 146) 6-7. 
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ratings, none of which might actually be considered incorrect.170  CRAs will 
not violate the obligation to use rigorous, systematic, and continuous 
methodologies merely because it would later turn out the rating does not 
truly reflect the issuer’s creditworthiness.171  This is only the case when the 
incorrect rating is the result of a CRA’s wrongful behavior, for example 
because it used a rating methodology that no reasonable and competent 
CRA would ever use.172  One might also refer to case law dealing with the 
liability of issuers under Section 11 & 12 of the 1933 United States 
Securities Act.173  Issuers will not face prospectus liability when reporting 
honest ratings that later turn out to be inaccurate or merely because the CRA 
could have formed “better opinions” (internal quotation marks omitted).174  
The mere fact that ratings would have been different by using another 
methodology is insufficient to state a claim against the issuer.175  Ratings 
cannot be false merely because CRAs should have used better or other 
rating methods or data.176 
C. Obligations of Classification Societies Before Issuing the 
Certificate 
Similar to CRAs, classification societies have to perform surveys before 
issuing a certificate.  In their private role, they conduct surveys to examine 
whether the vessel’s condition complies with the approved plans and class 
rules.  In their public role, they act on behalf of flag States and attest 
whether a vessel complies with (inter)national safety standards.  Class 
surveys have to be carried out according to the technical requirements laid 
down in the class rules or in the applicable legislation.177  Classification 
societies perform periodical and non-periodical surveys of the vessel’s hull 
and machinery.  Periodical surveys include the class renewal/special 
survey,178 the intermediate survey,179 the annual survey180 and (specific) 
bottom/docking surveys of the hull or boiler and machinery surveys.181 
 
 170. 2013 O.J. (L 146) 8. 
 171. See 2013 O.J. L 146 6-8. 
 172. 2013 O.J. (L 146) 8; Wymeersch & Kruithof, supra note 17, at 20. 
 173. United States Securities Act of 1933, Title I of Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, enacted on May 27, 
1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006). 
 174. Plumbers’ Union v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 775 (1st Cir. 2011); 
Plumbers’ Union v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-303, 309-310 (D. Mass. 
2009). 
 175. Plumbers’ Union II, 632 F.3d at 775. 
 176. Id. at 774-76; Boilermakers Nat. Annuity Trust v. Wamu Mortg., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1256 
(W.D. Wash. 2010). 
 177. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (IACS), CLASSIFICATION 
SOCIETIES WHAT, WHY AND HOW? 5-6 (2011). 
 178. IACS holds the class renewal/special survey every 5 years.  It includes extensive in and out-
of-water examinations to verify that the vessel’s structure, the main and essential auxiliary machinery or 
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Class certificates do, however, not imply and cannot be construed as a 
warranty of safety and fitness of the vessel.182  In other words, the certificate 
does not guarantee the ship’s seaworthiness.183  It merely is an attestation 
that the vessel complies with the class rules.184  Class rules do not cover 
every piece of structure or item.185  Instead, they contain a certain standard 
of safety which has to be state-of-the-art.186  Classification societies, 
therefore, do not guarantee that a vessel is absolutely safe or suitable for its 
intended services.187  The aim of classification and certification services is 
to ascertain that a certain vessel or particular item is state-of-the-art at the 
time of the survey.188  Against this background, scholars conclude that 
classification societies have to perform the surveys with care, without 
guaranteeing a particular result or completion of specific work (e.g. 
safeguarding the seaworthiness of the vessel).189  Such a conception also 
corresponds with the wording used in class rules or agreements.190  
Classification societies perform their “pre-issuance” obligations carefully by 
using the normally applied testing standards, procedures and techniques for 
the purpose of assigning and maintaining class.191 
 
systems and the equipment remain in a condition that comply with the class rules.  Id. at 6.  The special 
survey involves a thorough analysis of all parts of the ship covered by the class rules.  “Instead of a time-
consuming special survey once in five years, the shipowner may opt for a [c]ontinuous [s]urvey in which 
not all the check-ups are conducted simultaneously . . . [E]ach and every part is surveyed at times 
favourable to the schedule of the ship.  Nonetheless, all parts covered by the classification must be 
checked at least once in five years.” LAGONI, supra note 19, at 47. 
 179. The intermediate survey is held approximately half way between two special surveys. The 
survey aims to determine whether the vessel remains in a general condition which satisfies class rules. 
IACS, supra note 177, at 6. 
 180. The ship is also examined during an annual survey.  Such a survey includes an external and 
general inspection of the hull, equipment and machinery to establish whether the vessel’s general 
condition still satisfies the requirements contained in the class rules. See LAGONI, supra note 19, 47; 
IACS, supra note 177, at 6. 
 181. IACS, supra note 177, at 5; Miller, supra note 21, at 80-81. 
 182. IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 5. 
 186. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 48 
 187. IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 188. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 48. 
 189. See, e.g., Antapassis, supra note 27, at 16. 
 190. IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 191. According to the terms and conditions of American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), the society 
only represents to the shipowner that when assigning class, it uses “normally applied testing standards, 
procedures, and techniques” as called for by the rules, standards or other criteria of ABS for the purpose 
of assigning and maintaining class. 
AM. BUREAU OF SHIPPING (ABS), RULES FOR CONDITIONS OF CLASSIFICATION 2016, Part 1, ch. 1, §1, 
R. 5.  Article 5 of the Bureau Veritas Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships stipulates that the 
“Society acts as a provider of services.  This cannot be construed as an obligation bearing on the Society 
to obtain a result or as a warranty” BUREAU VERITAS, RULES FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF STEEL SHIPS, 
art. 5.1 (July 2013). 
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Thus, class surveys leading to the certificate qualify as obligations de 
moyen.  There will not be a ground for liability merely because a classed 
vessel sinks but only when the classification society did not carefully 
perform the surveys.  This has also been affirmed by decisions dealing with 
the nature of the contractual obligations of classification societies in 
different jurisdictions; for instance, courts in Belgium have accepted that a 
classification society is only obliged to apply the normally required 
diligence during the surveys, without necessarily being required to achieve a 
specific anticipated result.192  With some exceptions,193 courts in France 
have also ruled that classification societies commit themselves to an 
“obligation de diligence” when performing surveys.194  Finally, several 
cases dealing with the contractual liability of classification societies under 
US law also held that classification societies are only required to exercise 
due care in reviewing the design and surveying the vessel’s construction 
before issuing the certificate.195  The court in the Great American case held 
that a society has to perform two duties with due care towards “its 
clientele”.196  The first duty is to survey and classify vessels in accordance 
with class rules and standards.197  However, the court immediately stressed 
that a breach of this duty cannot lead to recovery for the plaintiff.198  This 
“bar stems from the long-standing policy or rule that the owner of a ship has 
a non-delegable duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel.”199  The second duty is 
one of due care in the detection of defects in ships and the notification 
thereof to the owner.200  A society is required to notify the shipowners of 
any defect if these are not yet known or apparent.201 
 
 192. Tribunal de Première Instance [TPI] [Tribunal of First Instance] Dendermonde, civ., Jan. 11, 
1973 as reported in JURISPRUDENCE ANVERS 127 at 128 (Fr.); Commercial Court Antwerp, Sept. 20, 
2006, no. A/02/04109 (unpublished); Court of Appeal Antwerpen, Feb. 18, 2013 as reported in NIEUW 
JURIDISCH WEEKBLAD 659 (2013). 
 193. Cours d’appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Versailles, civ., Mar. 21, 1996, DROIT 
MARITIME FRANÇAIS 721. 
 194. Cours d’appel [CA][regional court of appeal], Paris, civ. Dec. 12, 1972, DROIT MARITIME 
FRANÇAIS; Cours commercial [civ.][commercial court] Le Havre, August 25, 1978, DROIT MARITIME 
FRANÇAIS 103 (1979). 
 195. Continental Ins. Co. v. Daewoo Shipbuilding, 707 F. Supp. 123, 123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 196. Great Am. Ins. Co. v Bureau Veritas, 338 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 197. Id.. at 1011-12. 
 198. Id.. at 1012. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Great Am. Ins. Co., at F. Supp. at 1013;  see also Miller, supra note 21, at 90. 
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D. Obligations of Product Certifiers and Notified Bodies Before 
Issuing the Certificate 
Third-party certifiers inspect the product or related information before 
issuing the certificate.202  Certifiers often stipulate in the contracts or terms 
and conditions that they only perform their certification services carefully or 
diligently.203  The SGS conditions for certification services, for example, 
specify that the certifier provides certification services using “reasonable 
care and skill.”204  Similarly, the general conditions of certification of 
Bureau Veritas stipulate that the certifier has to provide the services and 
deliver the certificate with reasonable care, skill, and diligence as can be 
expected from a competent body experienced in the certification industry.205  
Bureau Veritas does not owe any specific success but only the performance 
of certification services.206 
Product certifiers are very clear in the (contractual) terms and 
conditions on this point; several cases have come to similar conclusions.207  
In the United States, for instance, the Court for the Southern District of New 
York concluded in Vitol Trading v. SGS that inspectors are not insurers of 
their work.208  Therefore, they cannot “be held liable solely on the basis of 
an undesirable or incorrect outcome.”209  The third-party certifier has to 
inspect the product with the due care and skill that a reasonably prudent 
tester would have used under the same circumstances.210  The liability of 
product certifiers has also been a stake in civil law jurisdictions such as 
Belgium; for example, the Antwerp Court of Appeal vacated a first instance 
decision, when deciding that “aucune obligation de résultat ne pèse sur 
l’organisme de contrôle [. . .] mais seulement une obligation de moyens.”211  
Inspections have to be performed in a skillful and workman-like way and 
 
 202. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 1. 
 203. See, e.g., General Conditions of Service, supra note 44. 
 204. See SGS General Conditions of Service, SGS Article 2(a) (Oct. 9, 2007), 
https://www.sgs.com/-/media/global/documents/technical-documents/legal-documents/sgs-legal-general-
conditions-of-services-a4-en-14-11.pdf?la=en. 
 205. General Terms and Conditions for Certification Services, BUREAU VERITAS Article 6.1 (Jan. 
2, 2017), 
http://www.bureauveritas.com.co/1884447e-8dcc-4bdc-8394-
292ed3d22765/General+Conditions+of+Services+UKAS+%281%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
 206. Id. at art. 7.2. 
 207. See e.g., id. at art. 2.1; Vitol Trading SA Inc. v. SGS Control Services Inc., 680 F. Supp. at 
559, 567 (1987), rev’d, 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  In the Interore case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that SGS only had 
to carry out the inspection of a vessel with reasonable care. Int’l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control 
Services, Inc., 38 F.3d 1279, 1284 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 211. See Tribunal de Première Instance [Tribunal of First Instance], civ., Antwerpen, Feb. 24, 
2010 (unpublished). 
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aimed to detect shortcomings in the product.212  The certifier has to 
safeguard that it correctly performs its inspection and control duties 
(obligation de moyen) but cannot guarantee that it will discover any 
concealed damage in the product (obligation de résultat).213  The French 
Cour de Cassation reached a similar conclusion when a consumer purchased 
a television which had been certified by the Association Française de 
Normalisation (AFNOR).214  The television broke shortly after and the 
plaintiff claimed recovery from the certifier.215  The plaintiff argued that the 
AFNOR certification was a guarantee of the quality and safety of the 
product.216  The judges in the first instance court and on appeal followed 
this line of reasoning.217  The Supreme Court, however, vacated the 
decision.218  AFNOR did not guarantee the product would be free of defects 
merely by attaching its certificate.219 
Things are similar for notified bodies during the conformity assessment 
procedure of medical devices.220  It has already been mentioned that the 
conformity assessment procedure sometimes requires the involvement of a 
notified body.221  In this regard, EU Recommendation 2013/473 on audits 
and assessments performed by notified bodies stipulates the latter should 
apply “special care” when examining the design, manufacture, and 
packaging of medical devices.222  Although the notion of special care 
remains unclear, it might point towards an obligation de moyen during the 
first stage of the certification process.223  Such a finding also corresponds 
with the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the PIP breast implant case.  TüV Rheinland was involved 
as a notified body in the conformity assessment procedure of the breast 
implants.  Considering that claims against PIP were fruitless as the company 
went bankrupt in 2010, the plaintiffs had to find other targets against whom 
to claim compensation for their physical harm or the financial losses.224  
 
 212. Cour d’appel [Civ.][Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, Sept. 17, 2013 as reported in TIJDSCHRIFT 
VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT-REVUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 550-51. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Cour de cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., Oct. 2, 2007, Bull. 
Civ. I, No. 315 (Fr.). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Cour de cassation [Cass.]Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e. civ., Oct. 2, 2007, Bull. 
Civ. I, No. 315. 
 220. 2013 O.J. (L. 253) 27. 
 221. Id at 29. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 345-46. 
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Therefore, a group of distributors and women brought a case against TüV 
before courts in Germany and France.  Because of the public importance of 
this case and the fact that a number of German courts were dealing with the 
same issues, the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) in Zweibrücken gave permission 
to appeal to the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH).  On April 9, 2015, the 
BGH referred three questions on the interpretation of the MDD to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).225 
Advocate General Sharpston of the ECJ concluded that Annex II to the 
MDD dealing with the EC Declaration of Conformity226 should be 
interpreted as meaning that, in the case of class III medical devices, the 
body responsible for auditing the quality system, examining the design of 
the product and surveillance is under a “duty to act with all due care and 
diligence.”  That duty will require it to exercise the powers available to it 
under the Annex to determine whether its certification of the device in 
question may stand.227  The judgement by the ECJ comes to a similar 
conclusion.  Notified bodies must be given an appropriate degree of 
discretion in view of the stringent requirements they must satisfy under the 
applicable legislation regarding their independence and scientific 
expertise.228  A notified body is not under a general obligation to carry out 
unannounced inspections, to examine devices, and/or to examine the 
manufacturer’s business records.229  However, they have to act with all due 
diligence when determining whether the certification may be maintained.230  
The French Tribunal de Commerce in Toulon held that TüV negligently 
performed its obligations of control/inspection, care, and vigilance.231  The 
certifier, for instance, did not carry out a sufficiently rigorous review of 
PIP’s financial accounts.  Such a review would have revealed the 
 
 225. BGH, April, 9, 2015 - VII ZR 36/14. 
 226. The EC declaration of conformity is the written statement and the declaration drawn up by 
the manufacturer to demonstrate the fulfilment of the EU requirements relating to a product bearing the 
CE marking he has manufactured. See also What is the EU/EC Declaration of Conformity for CE 
Marking?, CE-MARKING (Aug. 2008), http://www.ce-marking.com/required-content-for-CE-marking-
EC-declaration-of-conformity.html. 
 227. Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2016] E.C.R. 
para. 61(2). 
 228. Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2017] E.C.R. 
para. 45. 
 229. Id. at para. 48. 
 230. Id. at paras. 38-48.  One could argue that the use of “all due diligence” comes close to an 
obligation de résultat (‘statement of the rule’). Yet, when looking at the actual rationale and context of 
the ECJ in coming to that conclusion (e.g. degree of discretion given to notified bodies), I believe the 
ECJ actually means that a notified body is bound by an obligation de moyen (‘holding of the case’). 
 231. Commercial Court Toulon, November 14, 2013, n° RG 2011F00517, n° 2013F00567, 144. 
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abnormalities with regard to the amount of gel bought and the volume of 
PIP’s production.232 
TüV Rheinland appealed the decision.  The notified body claimed that it 
complied with the applicable requirements.  TüV maintained it was only 
responsible for controlling the design and the quality system and not the 
actual implants.  The certifier also argued that it had been systematically 
deceived by PIP, and that PIP had presented false documents.  TüV did not 
have sufficient powers under the MDD to take further actions to unmask the 
fraud.  The Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence followed this reasoning and 
reversed the first instance decision, which it held to be unfounded.  The 
court concluded that TüV Rheinland complied with its obligations under 
supranational law.  TüV only had an obligation to examine the technical file 
and not the device itself.  There were no elements in the file that should 
have warned the body that approved silicone products were replaced by 
other non-approved products.  Consequently, it was not at fault and, 
therefore, not liable.233 
Claims against TüV were also initiated before German courts.  A brief 
analysis of some of the arguments used in the decisions shows that notified 
bodies have to apply reasonable care in this stage of the certification 
process.  Imposing an obligation de résultat would, for instance, be 
challenging considering that the Oberlandesgericht in Zweibrücken held 
that certificates issued by notified bodies only constitute a building block 
(Baustein) for manufacturers to show they complied with the  requirements 
in the MDD.234  The objective of the MDD is to protect patients who come 
into contact with medical devices.  The MDD stipulates that devices should 
provide patients and users with a high level of protection and should attain 
 
 232. Id. at 142-43. The commercial court ordered TüV Rheinland to pay a provisional 
compensation of 3,000 euro per person to approximately 1,700 patients. The immediate and provisional 
character of the compensation was upheld and confirmed by the Cour d’Appel of Aix-En-Provence on 
21 January 2014 (Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, January, 21, 2014, no. 13/00690). See also van 
Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 345-46. 
 233. Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, July 2, 2015, no. 13/22482, 109, 113 & 119 
(“Contrairement à ce que prétendent les appelantes personnes physiques, les intimés et intervenantes, il 
résulte de la directive que lors de l’examen de la demande, l’organisme notifié n’avait pour obligation 
que d’examiner le dossier technique qui lui était soumis. Aucun élément ne pouvait laisser suspecter que 
le gel Nusil avait été remplacé par un gel non approuvé [. . .] La société AM a donc respecté les 
dispositions de la directive dans le cadre de la certification”). The case has been reported in several 
(online) journals and other sources: T. Klein, French Court Repeals Conviction against TÜV Rheinland 
in PIP Case, EUROPEAN MEDICAL DEVICE TECHNOLOGY, REGULATORY AND COMPLIANCE, July 2, 
2015; QMed, “Inspecting Company Wins Appeal in French Breast Implants Scandal”, July 2, 2015, 
available at 
<www.qmed.com/news/inspecting-company-wins-appeal-french-breast-implants-scandal>. 
 234. van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 344-45. 
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the performance attributed to them by the manufacturer.235  The OLG 
Zweibrücken, however, concluded that the MDD did not impose any 
statutory obligation on the notified body to intervene in order to protect all 
patients that might come into contact with medical devices.  The purpose 
and aim (Sinn und Zweck) of the certification is not to protect third parties.  
It is only a prerequisite for the manufacturer to distribute the implants on the 
EU market.  The certificate is an indication for the national authorities that 
the standards of care have been observed by the responsible parties without, 
however, relieving them of their responsibility.236 
III. SECOND STAGE OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS: ISSUING AN 
INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATE 
Based on the assessment of the item or related information, the certifier 
subsequently issues an independent certificate.  This is the second stage of 
the certification process.  Two important aspects related to a certifier’s 
independence need some elaboration.  On the one hand, (A) certifiers 
generally stress that the certificate is actually nothing more than an opinion.  
It should and cannot be used for any transactions.  The certificate merely 
attests that the certified item complies with the applicable requirements, 
nothing more and nothing less.  This illustrates the “restricted value” of 
certificates in the sense that there will not automatically be grounds for 
liability merely because the certificate does not correspond with the “real 
value” of the certified item. 
On the other hand, and despite the “restricted value” of certificates, (B) 
there are different moments in this stage where certifiers might face 
 
 235. Recital (5) Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices. In this regard, the recently 
adopted MDR aims to establish a robust, transparent, predictable and sustainable regulatory framework 
for medical devices ensuring a high degree of safety and health (Recital (1) Regulation 2017/745 on 
medical devices). 
 236. Court of Appeal Zweibrücken [OLG], January 30, 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 1. b) (Ger.); W. 
Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, TAYLORWESSING, (May 2015), 
www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/may15.html.  The ECJ, however, held that the aim of the MDD is not 
only the protection of health but also the safety of persons. The Directive does not only affect patients 
and users of devices but also ‘third parties’ and ‘other persons’.  The actual aim of the MDD is to protect 
end users of medical devices.  To that end, the MDD does not only impose obligations on the 
manufacturer of the device but also on Member States and notified bodies.  With regard to the 
involvement of the notified body in the procedure relating to the EC Declaration of Conformity, it is 
apparent from the wording and overall scheme of the MDD that the purpose of that procedure is to 
ensure protection for the health and safety of persons C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA 
Products GmbH, [2017], paras. 50-53.  At the same time, however, it does not necessarily follow from 
the fact that the MDD imposes surveillance obligations on certain bodies or the fact that one of its 
objectives is to protect injured parties that the Directive also seeks to confer rights on such parties in the 
event that those bodies fail to fulfil their obligations.  The ECJ eventually concluded that the conditions 
under which a notified body’s culpable failure to fulfil its obligations under the procedure relating to the 
EC Declaration of Conformity may give rise to its liability vis-à-vis the end users of medical devices are 
governed by national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.  Id. at paras. 55, 59. 
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liability.  Certifiers are obviously required to issue the certificate for which 
they are paid.  They will violate their obligations during the second stage 
when they do not issue the certificate or do so with a delay.  This is an 
obligation de résultat.  More importantly, certifiers have to remain 
independent towards the requesting entity.  Clear and strict requirements 
exist on a certifier’s independence.  This obligation also qualifies as an 
obligation de résultat.  As such, there can be potential grounds for liability 
when the third-party certifier did not issue an independent certificate, 
regardless of the question whether it acted carefully or not when issuing the 
certificate.237 
A. ‘Restricted Value’ of Certificates & Obligations of Requesting 
Entities 
Certificates issued by CRAs, classification societies, product certifiers, 
and notified bodies can serve as examples to illustrate the “restricted value” 
of certificates.  At the same time, the analysis shows that requesting entities 
remain responsible for the quality and safety of the certified item.  Rating 
contracts/reports, for instance, stress that ratings are mere opinions and not 
verifiable statements of facts.238  Ratings are not recommendations to buy, 
hold, or sell any securities.239  They do not comment on the adequacy of the 
market price or the suitability of an investment.240  As such, CRAs do not 
act as investment, financial, or other advisor of the issuer or any other 
recipient of the rating.241  Fitch’s Code of Conduct stipulates that  a contract 
does not create a fiduciary relationship242 between the CRA and the issuer 
 
 237. See supra Section III.B.  A certifier’s requirement to remain independent can be of 
importance in each of the three stages.  In the third stage, the certifier has to independently analyze and 
investigate the information.  Nevertheless, I have decided to categorize it in a second stage for several 
reasons.  The certifier has to cooperate with the requesting entity in the first and third stage of the 
certification process when gathering the required or updated information.  Based on this information, the 
certifier then “retrieves” to determine the certificate in an independent way.  Moreover, the reader might 
get a better understanding on the different obligations of certifiers when dividing the certification 
process into three categories, one of which is the issuance of a certificate in an independent way. 
 238. See  e.g. Wymeersch & Kruithof, supra note 17, at 42-43. 
 239. STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 2 (2014), 
https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/760102/SPRS_Understanding-
Ratings_GRE.pdf/298e606f-ce5b-4ece-9076-66810cd9b6aa. 
 240. Id. at 15. 
 241. Id. at 17. 
 242. See Legal Information Institute, Fiduciary Duty, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (July 2016), 
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty (discussing that a fiduciary duty is essentially a legal duty to 
act solely in another party’s interests. Parties owing such a duty are fiduciaries.  The individuals to 
whom they owe a duty are principals.  Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their 
principals unless they have the principals’ express informed consent.  They also have a duty to avoid any 
conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals or between their principals and the 
fiduciaries’ other clients.). 
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or any other person using the rating.243  The same cautionary wording is 
used in the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals244 as well as in the 
individual codes of conduct of each CRA.245 
A similar picture emerges when taking a look at classification societies.  
Once all surveys have been done and the classification society decides the 
vessel’s construction complies with the applicable class rules, it assigns a 
class to the vessel and issues a certificate accordingly.246  The certificate 
states that the vessel has been assigned a certain class and class notation.247  
In other words, it indicates “what has been, or according to the rules should 
have been, analyzed and surveyed. It does not give any further 
information.”248 
Class certificates, however, have their limitations, as the shipowner 
remains responsible for the seaworthiness of his vessel.249  The issuance of a 
certificate of class does not relieve the shipowner of his/her non-delegable 
duty to maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition.250  Even though class 
certificates might constitute evidence of seaworthiness,251 they do not 
 
 243. FITCH RATINGS, CODE OF CONDUCT, 17, § 4.5. 
 244. TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118 at 3. 
 245. Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct stipulates that “MIS is in no way providing a 
guarantee with regard to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or 
contained, in the Credit Rating or any related MIS publication.”  MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 84, at 7.  Paragraph 7.2 in the S&P’s Code of Conduct indicates 
that “ratings do not constitute investment, financial, or other advice . . . Credit Ratings do not comment 
on the suitability of an investment for a particular investor and should not be relied on when making any 
investment decision . . . Credit Ratings are not verifiable statements of fact.” Id. at 8. 
 246. IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 247. Classification notations indicate the specific rule requirements that have been met.  
Additional voluntary notations are offered by individual societies to demonstrate that the vessel 
conforms to a particular standard. IACS, supra note 177, at 10; THOMAS J. PAGONIS, CHARTERING 
PRACTICE HANDBOOK 83 (5th ed. 2009); LAGONI, supra note 19, at 6.  In addition, each classification 
society developed class notations or symbols that may be granted to a ship to indicate that it complies 
with voluntary criteria.  IACS, supra note 177, at 11. 
 248. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 49. 
 249. See IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 250. See also ABS, supra note 191 (stipulating that “Nothing contained in any certificate . . . is to 
be deemed to relieve any designer . . . Owner, manufacturer . . . insurer or other . . . person of any duty to 
inspect [the vessel] or any other [contractual] duty. ABS, supra note 191.  The certificate attests only 
that at the time of survey, the vessel covered by a certificate complied with the applicable requirements 
and standards in class rules. Id.  The classification society is not an insurer or guarantor of the integrity 
or safety of a vessel or of any of its equipment or machinery. Id.  The Rules of ABS are not meant as a 
substitute for the independent judgment of professional designers or shipowner. Id. 
 251. Hannu Honka, The Classification System and Its Problems with Special Reference to the 
Liability of Classification Societies, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 3 (1994); see, e.g.,  Tribunal de Permiere 
Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Termonde, 4e ch. Jan. 11, 1093, RECHTSPRAAK VAN DE 
HAVEN VAN ANTWERPEN [RABG] 1973, 127 (Belg.); Cour D’Appel [Civ.] [Court of Appeals] 
D’Anvers, 4e ch. May 10, 1994, RECHTSPRAAK VAN DE HAVEN VAN ANTWERPEN [RABG] 1995, 301 
(Belg.). 
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“warrant the seaworthiness of a vessel.”252  It is merely a representation that 
the vessel complied with the class rules at the time of the construction or the 
latest survey.253  Class certificates do “not imply, and should not be 
construed as, a warranty of safety, fitness for purpose or seaworthiness of 
the ship.”254  “Classification societies are not guarantors of safety of life or 
property at sea or the seaworthiness of a vessel.”255  They have no control 
regarding the way “a vessel is manned, operated and maintained between 
the periodical [class] surveys[.]”256  Several court decisions also established 
that the shipowner has the duty to ensure the vessel is seaworthy.257  This is 
an obligation that cannot be delegated to classification societies.258 
Several examples show that certificates issued by third-party product 
certifiers are no exception to the rule.259  For instance, the Intertek terms and 
conditions stipulate that the certifier merely tests and evaluates the 
submitted product samples and service without guaranteeing their quality.260  
Similarly, the terms and conditions of business of TüV Rheinland specify 
there is no assumption of any guarantee of correctness, quality, or working 
 
 252. B.D. Daniel, Potential Liability of Marine Classification Societies to Non-Contracting 
Parties, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 183, 196 (2006). 
 253. Id. 
 254. IACS, supra note 177, at 3. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Sundance Cruises Corp. v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 799 F. Supp. 363, 384 (S.D. N.Y. 1992), 
aff’d, 7 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 258. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp.at 1015; Sundance Cruises Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 
384; Cour D’Appel [Civ.] [Court of Appeals] D’Anvers, February 14, 1995, RECHTSPRAAK HAVEN VAN 
ANTWERPEN, 325 (Belg.); Cour D’Appel [Civ.] [Court of Appeals] D’Anvers, 4e ch. May 10, 1994, 
RECHTSPRAAK VAN DE HAVEN VAN ANTWERPEN [RABG] 1995, 301 (Belg.); Commercial Court 
Antwerp, September 20, 2006, A/02/04109 (unpublished); Court of Appeal Antwerpen, February 18, 
2013 as reported in NIEUW JURIDISCH WEEKBLAD 659 (2013). 
 259. INTERTEK TESTING SERVICES, CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT FOR U.S. FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATION COMMISSION TELECOMMUNICATIONS CERTIFICATION BODY PROGRAM § 2.1(Sept. 12, 
2012); General Terms and Conditions of Business of TüV Rheinland Industrie Service GmbH, TÜV 
RHEINLAND (Nov. 2012),  
www.tuv.com/media/germany/10_industrialservices/agbs/TIS-AGB_Stand_November_2012-
Englisch_TUV-Rheinland.pdf (§ 4.4) [hereinafter General Terms]; STEELWORK COMPLIANCE 
AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL STEELWORK COMPLIANCE SCHEME LICENSING AGREEMENT FOR THE USE OF 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY AND CERTIFICATION MARK art. 3.3 (Aug. 2014). 
 260. INTERTEK TESTING SERVICES, CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT FOR U.S. FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATION COMMISSION TELECOMMUNICATIONS CERTIFICATION BODY PROGRAM § 2.1(Sept. 12, 
2012); General Terms and Conditions of Business of TüV Rheinland Industrie Service GmbH, TÜV 
RHEINLAND (Nov. 2012),  
www.tuv.com/media/germany/10_industrialservices/agbs/TIS-AGB_Stand_November_2012-
Englisch_TUV-Rheinland.pdf (§ 4.4) [hereinafter General Terms]; STEELWORK COMPLIANCE 
AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL STEELWORK COMPLIANCE SCHEME LICENSING AGREEMENT FOR THE USE OF 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY AND CERTIFICATION MARK art. 3.3 (Aug. 2014). 
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of the certified product.261  The certification agreement with Steelwork 
Compliance Australia stipulates that the certifier “does not assume or 
undertake to discharge any responsibility to any other party or parties” when 
performing its contractual duties.262  The requesting entity acknowledges 
that the certifier “does not warrant or guarantee the correctness of its 
opinions” or certificates.263  Finally, the SGS general conditions for 
certification services mention that the certifier does not take the place of the 
client by entering into the contract or providing the certification services.264  
The requesting entity remains responsible to ensure the safety and quality of 
its products.265  The restricted value of the certificate and the obligation of 
the manufacturers concerning the quality and safety of products has also 
been accepted  by the courts.266 
The value of the certificates issued by notified bodies during the 
conformity assessment of medical devices also has some restrictions.  
Notified bodies perform an assessment of the product and the 
manufacturer’s quality system.  However, the manufacturer of the products 
has to ensure the requirements in the relevant conformity assessment 
procedure are met.  Whether or not a notified body has been involved in the 
conformity assessment procedure, the manufacturer remains responsible to 
affix the CE marking, to issue the Declaration of Conformity, and to 
guarantee compliance with the applicable EU legislation.267 
The decisions by the German courts in the PIP case came to similar 
conclusions.  The Court of Appeal in Zweibrücken affirmed a first instance 
decision.268  Certificates issued by notified bodies constitute a “Baustein” 
for manufacturers to show they complied with the requirements of the 
MDD.  As such, the “Sinn und Zweck” of the certification was not to 
protect third parties.  Instead, it was only a requisite for the manufacturer to 
 
 261. General Terms, supra note 260. 
 262. STEELWORK COMPLIANCE AUSTRALIA, supra note 260, at art. 12. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Article 3.3. SGS General Conditions for Certification Services, supra note 11. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 687-88 (1969).  For a discussion of the case 
see Justin T. Beck, Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.: Liability of Product Certifiers, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 137, 151 
(1970).  One reason why the court denied the application of strict liability in the case of certifiers was 
that it would not be justified to apply strict liability since the latter could not protect itself against 
possible defects in manufacture. Id. at 144.  More specifically, the court held that the “[a]pplication of 
either warranty or strict liability in tort would subject respondent to liability even if the general design 
and material used in making this brand of shoe were good, but the particular pair became defective 
through some mishap in the manufacturing process”. Hanberry, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 867-88; see also 
JEFFREY BELSON, CERTIFICATION MARKS 50 (2002). 
 267. European Commission, “Commission Notice. The ‘Blue Guide’ on the implementation of EU 
product rules 2016”, 2016/C 272/01, 57 & 60. 
 268. See RECHTSPRECHUNG DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN FRANKENTHAL [OLGZ] Mar. 14, 
2013, 3, 2013 (Ger.). 
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sell the implants on the European market.  The purpose of the CE label 
given to a medical device is not to provide buyers with a right to claim 
compensation from a notified body involved in the conformity assessment 
procedure.269  The conformity assessment procedure undertaken by TüV did 
not create a guarantee the implants complied with the essential requirements 
of the MDD.  The manufacturer of the devices remains responsible for the 
quality and safety of its products.  Consequently,  the manufacturer assumes 
the risks when the device turns out to be defective and causes injuries to 
patients.270 
B. The Third-Party Certifier’s Independence During the Certification 
Process 
Third-party certifiers thus stress that certificates have a “restricted 
value” in the sense that they cannot be relied upon by third parties to make 
decisions.  The rating is only an opinion and not a recommendation; the CE 
marking is only a requirement to place medical devices on the European 
market and a class certificate is merely a representation that the vessel 
complied with the class rules.  Certifiers also emphasize that the requesting 
entity remains responsible for the safety and quality of the certified item.  
As such, the requesting entity is responsible in case the certified item would 
default once the certificate has been issued.  Based on these findings, one 
might conclude that holding certifiers liable is unlikely.  This conclusion is 
further strengthened by the inclusion of clauses in certification agreements 
and codes of practice which exclude or limit the certifier’s liability.271 
 
 269. See, e.g., OLGZ (Sec. 28) (Ger.). See for a translation and discussion of the case W. 
Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, TAYLORWESSING, (May 2015), 
www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/may15.html. 
 270. See OLGZ (Sec. 54) (Ger.); van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 345; W.Rehmann & 
D.Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, TAYLORWESSING, (May 2015), 
www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/may15.html. 
 271. Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct, for instance, stipulates that: 
[t]o the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, 
representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for any 
indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages whatsoever arising from or in 
connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such 
information, even if MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, 
representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses 
or damages, including but not limited to: (a) any loss of present or prospective profits or (b) 
any loss or damage arising where the relevant financial instrument is not the subject of a 
particular credit rating assigned by MOODY’S.  To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S 
and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim 
liability for any direct or compensatory losses or damages caused to any person or entity, 
including but not limited to by any negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or 
any other type of liability that, for the avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the 
part of, or any contingency within or beyond the control of, MOODY’S or any of its 
32
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss2/2
2018] THIRD-PARTY CERTIFIERS 235 
 
However, this needs to be seen from a more nuanced perspective.  
Certifiers have already been held liable in the past, both towards the 
requesting entity as well as third parties.272  For example, there can be 
grounds for liability when the certifier did not carefully perform the analysis 
during the first stage of the certification process.273  There is another ground 
leading to liability when the third-party certifier did not remain independent 
towards the requesting entity.  Certification contracts, the certifier’s general 
terms and conditions, case law, and supranational legislation emphasize that 
certifiers have to remain independent vis-à-vis the requesting entity.274  
These sources contain clear, strict, and specific requirements that certifiers 
have to comply with to safeguard that the certificate is issued in an 
independent way.275  A certifier’s independence actually relates to its 
intention to remain independent, which can, for example, vary between the 
binary numbers 1—total independence—and 0—no independence.  In order 
to achieve total independence, the above-mentioned sources contain clear, 
strict, and specific requirements certifiers have to comply with.  A certifier’s 
compliance with these requirements to guarantee that certificates are issued 
in an independent way can be qualified as obligation de résultat.  A certifier 
does not have any discretion when deciding on actions to ensure its 
independence.  The result that a certifier needs to achieve, namely 
compliance with the applicable requirements to ensure independence, does 
not depend upon the level of care it applies, nor upon the requesting entity’s 
cooperation.  Arguably, a requesting entity should not even be involved 
when a certifier issues the certificate in an independent way.276  
directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or 
in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such 
information. 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 84. 
 272. See, e.g., Bathurst Regional Council, [No. 5] (2012) FCA 1200, 1457; Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); Cal. 
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 645, 664 
(2014); Otto Candies LLC v. Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp., 346 F.3d 530, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2003); Case C-
219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmhH, 2016. 
 273. See supra Section II. 
 274. INTERTEK TESTING SERVICES, supra note 260; Terms and Conditions - General Conditions 
for Certification Services, supra note 50 (art. 13.6); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 
181; 2016 O.J. (C 272) 67. 
 275. INTERTEK TESTING SERVICES, supra note 260; see, e.g., Terms and Conditions - General 
Conditions for Certification Services, supra note 50 (art. 13.6); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. 
Supp. 2d at 181; 2016 O.J. (C 272) 67. 
 276. See also M. KRUITHOF, “Wanneer vormen tegenstrijdige belangen een belangenconflict?”, in 
C. VAN DER ELST, H. DE WULF, R. STEENNOT & M. TISON, Van alle markten: liber amicorum Eddy 
Wymeersch, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2008, 591-592, no. 21-22. This is not surprising when taking a 
comparative approach and looking into practices of other providers of information such as architects. 
Compare, Reglement de Deontologie [Rules of Ethics] of Mar. 8, 1985, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], April 18, 1985, Art. 4, (Belg.) with Sur La Protection Du Ttite Et De La 
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The qualification as obligation de résultat is reinforced by the fact that 
none of the previously mentioned elements pointing towards an obligation 
de moyen apply when third-party certifiers have to remain independent 
when issuing certificates.277  The achieved result (namely the certifier’s 
independence) does, for instance, not depend upon the level of care they 
apply, nor upon the cooperation of the requesting entity.  Arguably, the 
requesting entity should not even be involved when a certifier issues the 
certificate.278  Recourse can also be taken in the situation where each 
individual certifier to underpin this conclusion.  The following parts focus 
on (1) the obligation to remain independent in the context of CRAs, (2) 
classification societies, and (3) product certifiers or notified bodies. 
1. The Case of Credit Rating Agencies 
The role and position of CRAs as intermediaries on financial markets 
urges them to display the necessary independence vis-a-vis issuers.  An 
independent assessment of creditworthiness is not only what the issuer pays 
for but also necessary for financial intermediaries to remain in business.  
CRAs certify the credibility of the issuer by pledging their “reputational 
capital.”279  This allows investors to trust the issuer’s statements concerning 
its creditworthiness where they otherwise might not have.  CRAs acquire 
this reputational capital over many years by rating many clients.  However, 
they might lose it if their ratings are not reliable or objective.  The idea is 
that CRAs are less willing to violate legal provisions than the issuer because 
of the potential risk of litigation or fear of losing this reputational capital.   
Profession D’Architecte [On The Protection Of The Title And The Profession Of Architect] of Feb. 20, 
1939, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 25, 1939, Art. 4, (Belg.).  A brief 
analysis reveals that the obligation to remain independent is often essential as well. Reglement de 
Deontologie of Mar. 8, 1985 Moniteur Belge, April 18, 1985, Art. 4.  In Belgium, for instance, the 
architect is required to be independent towards the principal (client), building contractors, and other 
parties involved in the construction process. Id.  Such independence is necessary to properly perform his 
profession. Id.  The public interest benefits from buildings that are safe; therefore, the quality control of 
such buildings has to be performed by an expert who is independent from the persons responsible for 
building the construction and the architect who does not remain independent violates the Act concerning 
the protection of the title of architect See Sur La Protection Du Ttite Et De La Profession D’Architecte 
[On The Protection Of The Title And The Profession Of Architect] of Feb. 20, 1939, MONITEUR BELGE 
[M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 25, 1939, Art. 4, (Belg.).See: Philippe Colle & Koenraad 
Troch, Algemeen overzicht van de beginselen inzake aansprakelijkheid van de bouwheer, architect, 
aannemer, ingenieur en/of studiebureau, 3 TIJDSCHRIFT VERZEKERINGSRECHT 28 (2000).  Several 
decisions also accepted that an architect’s independence is the cornerstone of his profession. Cour de 
Cassation [Civ.] [The Supreme Court], Dec. 1, 1994, REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE DE LEIGE, MONS 
BRUXELLES [JLMB] 1077, 1078 (Belg.); Cour d’Appel Gent [Civ] [Court of Appeal Ghent] 9e. June 29, 
2007, RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1135, 1136-1138 (Belg.). 
 277. See supra Section II.A. 
 278. See Andrea Miglionico, Market Failure or Regulatory Failure? The Paradoxical Position of 
Credit Rating Agencies, 9 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 194, 201 (the involvement of the requesting entity 
creates a conflict of interest and therefore that entity should not be involved to insure independence.). 
 279. Id. at 196. 
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The loss of reputational capital can lead to the collapse of CRAs as 
investors will no longer trust their ratings.  Thus, CRAs are believed to 
remain independent from the issuer during the rating process to guarantee 
ratings are of adequate quality.  If this is not the case and CRAs are instead 
paid to give favorable but flawed ratings, investors might no longer use their 
services.280 
Several sources require CRAs to remain independent towards the issuer 
when issuing a credit rating.  The IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals, 
the individual codes of conducts of CRAs, as well as some of the examined 
rating contracts, emphasize that ratings are independent opinions based on 
the information provided by the issuer.281  There is also case law which 
stresses the independence of CRAs and proper management of conflicts of 
interest.282  The Abu Dhabi court held that “the market at large . . . ha[s] 
 
 280. See JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS  AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, 1-5, 287-88, 325 (2006); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for 
a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASHINGTON U. L. Q. 491, 494-95 (2001); D.W. Diamond, 
Reputational Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. of Pol.l Econ. 828 (1989); V.P. Goldberg, Accountable 
Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); D.M. Covitz & P. 
Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that 
Reputation Incentives Dominate,  
December 2003 available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf. 
However, some have argued that following the accounting irregularities in the late 1990s, “reputational 
pressures alone do not create adequate incentives for issuers to disclose material facts, or for gatekeepers 
to certify that issuers have done so.” Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to 
Professor Coffee, U. OF SAN DIEGO LAW & ECON RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 1, 3 (2004).  In the context 
of CRAs, for instance, Miglionico observes that reputational capital and reputation alone are not a 
workable constraint on gatekeeper certification. Miglionico, supra note 278, at 198. 
 281. See, e.g., IOSCO, supra note 118, at 9-10, 12-13 (2014).  Part 2 of the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals contains several general obligations for CRAs to ensure their independence, 
specifically that. CRAs should operationally and legally separate their rating business from any other 
business that may present conflicts of interest.  The IOSCO Code also includes several requirements 
with regard to procedures and policies, CRAs are under certain circumstances required to disclose the 
general nature of their compensation arrangements with the issuers and the independence of analysts and 
employees. Id. at 9-11.  Any analyst who becomes involved in a personal relationship that creates the 
potential for any real or apparent conflict of interest should be required to disclose such relationship. Id. 
at 12-13; see TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM., supra note 118, at 7.  Individual Codes 
of Conduct also contain provisions on the independence of CRAs. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra 
note 84, at 10-11.  Moody’s professional Code of Conduct, for instance, includes a section on the 
“Independence and Avoidance and/or Management of Conflicts of Interest”. Id. at 10.  Moody’s has to 
use “professional judgment to maintain both the substance and appearance of independence and 
objectivity.” Id. at 11.  The section also includes provisions regarding the independence of rating 
analysists. Id.  Their compensation arrangements, for instance, need to be organized in such a way to 
eliminate or manage conflicts of interest. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 84, at 10-11. 
 282. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d at18; King Cty. Wash. v. IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-94 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).  These conflicts of interest 
follow from the issuer-pays business model and lead to the situation where the issuer whose 
creditworthiness is being controlled and rated pays for these services. Lawrence J. White, Credit-rating 
agencies and the financial crisis: less regulation of CRAs is a better response, 25 J. INT’L BANKING LAW 
& REG. 170, 170 & 173 (2010); see Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflict of Interests in the Credit Rating 
Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 256 (2010); Scott J. Boylan, Will Credit Rating Agency 
Reforms be Effective?, 20 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 356, 363 (2012). 
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come to rely on the accuracy of credit ratings and the independence of 
rating agencies.”283  The CRA’s “role as an unbiased reporter of information 
typically requires the rating agency to remain independent of the issuers for 
which it rates notes”.284  The importance to remain independent has also 
been acknowledged by decisions that refused to qualify claims and 
statements in CRA’s codes of conduct on their independence as non-
actionable puffery.285  Such statements are not “couched in aspirational 
terms” but are a promise that policies and procedures are implemented to 
manage and avoid conflicts of interest.286  Furthermore, investors often 
allege that it was the lack of independence that caused CRAs to give flawed 
ratings to mortgage-backed securities.287  In other words, CRAs might not 
have issued incorrect ratings if they remained independent from the rated 
entities.288 
Article 6 of EU Regulation 1060/2009 contains several requirements to 
ensure CRAs remain independent from the rated entity.289  CRAs have to 
take “all necessary steps” to safeguard 
that the issuing of a credit rating is not affected by any existing or 
potential conflict of interest or business relationship involving the 
credit rating agency issuing the credit rating, its managers, rating 
analysts, employees, any other natural person whose services are 
 
 283. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
 284. Id. at 166. 
 285. Motion to Dismiss at 8, U.S. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. and Standard and Poor’s 
Financial Services LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183599 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (No. CV 13-0779-
DOC (JCGx) at 10 
 286. Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, U.S. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. and Standard and Poor’s 
Financial Services LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183599 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (No. CV 13-0779-
DOC (JCGx)); see also, In re Moody’s Corporation Securities Litigation, 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 509 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2009) (holding that “Moody’s statements regarding its own independence do not constitute 
inactionable puffery.  They were neither ‘vague’ nor ‘non-specific’ pronouncements that were incapable 
of objective verification . . . Moody’s not only proclaimed its independence; it also listed verifiable 
actions it was taking to ensure its independence . . . Rather than being general statements, these were 
specific steps that Moody’s was taking to ensure its independence and ratings integrity.”). Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 287. See, e.g., Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 809. 
 288. See id. (holding “an alleged conflict of interest developed such that the Rating Agencies 
abandoned their independence and relaxed their rating criteria and procedures in order to secure the 
business of the investment banks in rating these types of securities.”); see also In re Lehman Bros. Sec. 
and ERISA Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing conflicts of interest which 
contributed to incorrect ratings); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (discussing when 
rating agencies have conflicts of interest and that rating systems can be “deeply flawed and unreliable”); 
In re Standard & Poor’s Agency Litig., 23 F. Supp. 3d at 383-84 (noting that States and the District of 
Columbia brought nineteen cases against McGraw Hill Financial Inc. for misleading citizens by 
representing bond ratings as being independent and objective, when there were influenced by conflicts of 
interest); Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Serv., LLC., 813 F. Supp. 2d 
871, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (discussing inflated ratings and false representations regarding AAA ratings). 
 289. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 12. 
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placed at the disposal or under the control of the credit rating 
agency, or any person directly or indirectly linked to it by 
control.290 
This is strengthened considering the general obligation arising under Article 
6 of the Regulation which gives more content in the Annex of the 
Regulation.291 
Section A of Annex I of the Regulation contains several organizational 
requirements that have to be respected by CRAs in order to enhance their 
independence and avoid conflicts of interest.292  The CRA’s senior 
management has to ensure that the agency’s activities are independent 
“from all political and economic influences or constraints” and that 
“conflicts of interest are properly identified, managed and disclosed.”293  
CRAs must be organized in a way that safeguards their “business interest 
does not impair the independence or accuracy of the credit rating 
activities.”294  In addition, a CRA must “establish appropriate and effective 
organizational and administrative arrangements to prevent, identify, 
eliminate or manage and disclose any conflicts of interest.”295 
More relevant are the operational requirements listed in section B of 
Annex I.296  CRAs have to “identify, eliminate or manage and disclose 
clearly and prominently, any actual or potential conflict of interest that may 
influence the analyses and judgments of its rating analysts[.]”297  This 
objective is also pursued by several provisions in the Regulation itself.298  
Rating analysts and other persons directly involved in rating activities are 
not “allowed to initiate or participate in negotiations regarding fees or 
payments with any rated entity, related third party or any person directly or 
indirectly linked to the rated entity by control.”299  Furthermore, the 
“[c]ompensation and performance evaluation of rating analysts and persons 
approving the credit ratings shall not be contingent on the amount of 
revenue that the credit rating agency derives from the rated entities or 
related third parties.”300  Since long-lasting relationships with the same rated 
entities could compromise the independence of rating analysts and any other 
person approving ratings, a CRA also has to establish an appropriate  
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 23. 
 293. Id. 
 294. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 23. 
 295. Id. at 24. 
 296. Id. at 25. 
 297. Id. at 24. 
 298. Id. at 12. 
 299. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 12. 
 300. Id. 
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gradual rotation mechanism.301  Recital (12) in Regulation 462/2013 sets out 
a maximum duration of the contractual relationship between the issuer 
which is rated or which issued the rated debt instruments and the CRA, and 
this removes the incentive for issuing favorable ratings.302  Section B 
contains additional requirements to ensure a CRA is independent and helps 
to avoid conflicts of interest.303  A CRA must publicly disclose the names of 
the rated entities or related third parties from which it receives more than 
five percent of its annual revenue.304  Under certain circumstances, most of 
them related to the direct or indirect involvement of a CRA in the operation 
or management of the issuer of the financial instruments; a CRA is not 
authorized to issue a rating.305 
Moreover, a CRA is not allowed to “provide consultancy or advisory 
services to the rated entity or any related third party regarding the corporate 
or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities of that rated entity or related 
third party.”306  Although a CRA may provide certain ancillary services 
other than issuing ratings (e.g. market forecasts, estimates of economic 
trends, or pricing analysis), it must ensure that this does not create conflicts 
of interest with its rating activities.307  In addition, rating analysts or persons 
who approve ratings are not allowed to “make proposals or 
recommendations, either formally or informally, regarding the design of 
structured finance instruments on which the credit rating agency is expected 
to issue a credit rating.”308  CRAs also have to keep “adequate records and, 
where appropriate, audit trails of its rating activities[.]”309  Such records 
include among other items information related to fees received from any 
rated entity and the procedures and methodologies they employ to 
determine the credit ratings.310 
2. The Case of Classification Societies 
In the exercise of their private role, classification societies are also 
confronted with the situation wherein the entity that is being controlled and 
certified (the shipowner, and more specifically, the latter’s vessels) is the 
one paying for the control and certification.  A classification society gives 
an independent assessment of a vessel while it is at the same time 
 
 301. Id. at 4. 
 302. 2013 O.J. (L 146) 3. 
 303. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 25. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 25. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 25-26. 
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economically dependent upon the shipowner’s fleet.311  It is not unthinkable 
that a shipowner who is dissatisfied with a classification society will class 
hop to another one offering less rigorous terms and/or cheaper services.312  
This could result in a less strict application of technical standards in class 
rules.313 
Several sources require classification societies to remain independent 
towards the shipowner.  Some of the Membership Criteria of IACS included 
in the Charter314 are designed to demonstrate a classification society’s 
independence and impartiality.315 
This requirement is further specified in the Membership Criteria: 
Guidance and Application Procedure, which are listed in the Procedures 
concerning requirements for Membership of IACS.316 
In order to demonstrate independence from ship-owning, ship-building 
and other commercial interests that could undermine a classification 
society’s impartiality, its governing bodies must have less than fifty percent 
representation from combined shipowners, shipbuilders and other actors 
commercially engaged in the manufacture, equipping, repair or operation of 
ships and may not have shares of fifty percent or more in any of such 
entities.317  Furthermore, surveyors are not allowed to carry out 
classification or statutory work or participate in the decision-making related 
thereto if that surveyor has business, personal or family links to the 
requesting entity.318 
The IACS Charter also obliges classification societies to comply with 
the IACS Quality System Certification Scheme (QSCS),319 which in turn 
stipulates that the quality management system of an individual society has 
to adhere to the IACS Quality Management System Requirements to obtain 
a QSCS certification.320  These Requirements, which are incorporated in  
 311. Juan L. Pulido Begines, The EU Law on Classification Societies: Scope and Lability Issues, 
36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 493 (2005) (discussing the independence of classification societies and their 
reliance upon vessel owners). 
 312. Id. (discussing the tendency of ship owners to join a competing classification society when 
they do not like the requirements of their current classification society or have been denied). 
 313. Id.; see also Philippe Boisson, Classification Societies and Safety at Sea: Back to Basics to 
Prepare for the Future, 18 MARINE POLICY 363, 373 (1994) (discussing the lax application of standards 
due to “class hopping”); NICOLAI LAGONI, THE LIABILITY OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES, 26-27 (2007) 
(discussing the ability of classification societies to lower their requirements). 
 314. IACS Charter, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (Oct. 27, 2009), 
revised January 2018 www.iacs.org.uk/about. 
 315. International Association of Classification Societies, Procedures Concerning Requirements 
for Membership of IACS, 2 IACS Procedures 1, 5 (2017). 
 316. Id. at 7. 
 317. Id. at 12, E1.5. 
 318. Id. at11, D1.8. 
 319. IACS Charter, supra note 314, at Art. 2.2(a). 
 320. International Association of Classification Societies, IACS Quality System Certification 
Scheme, 3 IACS Procedures 1, 35-36 (2011) 
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Annex 2 of the QSCS, contain several conditions with regard to 
independence, impartiality and integrity of the society and its surveyors.321  
For instance, the society’s personnel has to be free from commercial, 
financial and other pressures that might affect their judgment.  Procedures 
must be implemented to ensure that persons or organisations external to the 
society cannot influence the results of its services.  Moreover, the 
remuneration of personal engaged in the society’s activities may not directly 
depend on the activities carried out and in no case on their results.  
Furthermore, the classification society (or its staff) may not be the designer, 
manufacturer, supplier, installer, purchaser, owner, user or maintainer of the 
item subject to the service.  The society or its staff may not engage in 
activities that conflict with their independence of judgment and their 
integrity.  In particular, classification societies are not allowed to become 
involved in the design, manufacture, supply, installation, use or 
maintenance of the items covered by the service.  Moreover, the society 
may not be controlled by shipowners or others commercially involved in the 
manufacture, equipping, repair or operation of ships.  It can also not 
substantially depend on a single commercial enterprise for its revenue.  
Finally, a surveyor is not allowed to carry out class or statutory work if it 
has business, personal or family links to the shipowner or operator.322 
As opposed to the situation for CRAs and by extension other capital-
market certifiers such as auditors,323 EU legislation does not contain 
measures to reduce potential conflicts of interest between the shipowner and 
classification societies (private role).  There are only provisions dealing 
with the independence of societies when acting as ROs (public role).  
Recital (9) of Directive 2009/15 stipulates that ROs need to be strictly 
independent and have specialised technical competence and rigorous quality 
management to carry out their duties in a satisfactory manner.324  Moreover, 
the RO may not be controlled by shipowners or shipbuilders or by other 
parties (commercially) engaged in the manufacture, equipping, repair or 
operation of ships.  ROs may also not be substantially dependent on a single 
commercial enterprise for its revenue.  The RO is not allowed to carry out 
class or statutory work if it is identical to or has business, personal or family 
 
www.iacs.org.uk/media/1768/procedures_vol3_rev4_pdf2340.pdf. 
 321. See especially Id. at Part. 4.3.2 (Impartiality and Integrity) and Part 4.3.3 (Independence 
Criteria) of Annex 2 of the QSCS, 48-49. 
 322. See Id. at Part. 4.3.2 (Impartiality and Integrity) and Part 4.3.3 (Independence Criteria) of 
Annex 2 of the QSCS, 48-49. 
 323. See for a comparative overview J. De Bruyne & C. Vanleenhove, An EU perspective on the 
liability of classification societies: selected current issues and private international law aspects, 20 J. OF 
INT’L  MAR. L. 110-11 (2014). 
 324. Directive 2009/15 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey 
organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administration. 
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links to the shipowner or operator.  This incompatibility also applies to 
surveyors employed by an RO.325  Besides supranational legislation, 
contracts between the classification society acting as an RO and the flag 
State can also emphasise that societies have to remain independent and 
impartial or contain provisions to prevent/minimise conflicts of interest.326 
3. The Case of Product Certifiers and Notified Bodies for 
Medical Devices 
The examined contractual terms and general conditions do not explicitly 
mention that a product certifier has to remain independent from the 
requesting entity, however, norms issued by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO)327 address the certifier’s independence and 
impartiality.  Article 4.2. in ISO 17065, for instance, stipulates that 
inspectors have to remain independent in the review and certification 
decision making process.328  The certification decision has to be carried out 
by a person who is not involved in the process for evaluating the product or 
service.329  Third-party certifiers are responsible to ensure their impartiality 
which cannot be compromised by financial, commercial, or other 
pressures.330  The certifier has to identify potential risks to his/her 
impartiality on an ongoing basis, and where such a risk is identified, 
 
 325. Annex I, A, 6 Regulation 391/2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and 
survey organisations. 
 326. The IMO Model Agreement, for instance, specifies that the RO endeavors to avoid 
undertaking activities which may result in a conflict of interest (Article 2.5. IMO Model Agreement for 
the Authorization of Recognized Organizations Acting on Behalf of the Administration, MSC/Circ.710 -
MEPC/Circ.307, October 9, 1995, available at www.sjofartsverket.se/pages/7148/307.pdf).  The 
agreement with the Swedish Transport Agency (STA) states that the RO has to act in an objective and 
impartial way when performing its duties on behalf of the STA. Employees of the RO may not give or 
receive gifts, rewards or other benefits when performing duties in accordance with the agreement.  
Employees may not be involved in any conflict of interest when performing duties.  A conflict of interest 
arises inter alia when the person performing the statutory certification or services, his or her next of kin 
or another person close to him or her (a) is a party concerned, (b) may expect extraordinary benefit or 
detriment from the result of the statutory certification or services, or (c) is a representative either of the 
person, company or organisation concerned or of someone else who may expect extraordinary benefit or 
detriment from the result of the statutory certification or service.  A conflict of interest will also arise 
when there are other special circumstances that may influence the impartiality of the person performing 
the statutory certification or services.  A person involved in such a conflict of interest may not perform 
duties on behalf of the STA (Article 3.5. Agreement Governing the Delegation of Statutory Certification 
& Services for Ships Registered in Sweden between the Swedish Transport Agency and XX, available at 
www.transportstyrelsen.se/globalassets/global/sjofart/fartyg/delegationsavtal-160101.pdf). 
 327. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT – 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES CERTIFYING PRODUCTS, PROCESSES AND SERVICES, cl. 4.2-4.2.3 (2012) 
(The ISO is an independent, non-governmental organization and the world’s largest developer of 
standards). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at cl. 7.6.2. 
 330. Id. at cl. 4.2.2. 
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demonstrate how it eliminates or minimizes it.331  Moreover, the certifier 
may not be involved in the design, manufacture, installation, distribution, or 
maintenance of the certified item.332  Therefore, the certifier is not allowed 
to offer consultancy or internal auditing services, or may not be linked with 
an organization providing such services to the requesting entity.333  Article 
5.2. further contains structural and organizational requirements to safeguard 
the certifiers’ impartiality.334  For instance, they need to have a 
“mechanism” to guarantee their impartiality.335  This mechanism has to 
provide input on policies and procedures relating to their independence.336 
The EU did not adopt legislation covering the independence of product 
certifiers in general, however, sectoral legislation contains several 
provisions dealing with their independence.337  Notified bodies, for instance, 
act as certifiers of medical devices in the conformity assessment 
procedure.338  Decision 768/2008/EC sets out requirements to ensure that 
notified bodies remain independent towards the manufacturer of medical 
devices.339  More specifically, they are not allowed to engage in any activity 
that may conflict with their independence of judgment or integrity (e.g. 
consultancy services).340  Annex XI of the MDD contains additional criteria 
for the designation of notified bodies.341  The notified body has to be an 
entity which is independent from the manufacturer of the product for which 
it performs conformity assessment activities.342  The notified body, its 
director, and the assessment or verification staff are not allowed to be the 
designer, manufacturer, supplier, installer, or user of the devices which they 
inspect.343  They may not be directly involved in the design, construction, 
marketing, or maintenance of the devices, nor represent the parties engaged 
in these activities.344  The notified body and its staff need to be free from all 
pressures and inducements which might influence their judgment or the 
results of the inspections.345  The remuneration of analysts should also not 
 
 331. Id. at cl. 4.2.3-4.2.4. 
 332. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT – 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES CERTIFYING PRODUCTS, PROCESSES AND SERVICES, cl. 4.2.6. 
 333. Id. (e). 
 334. Id. at cl. 5.2. 
 335. Id. at cl. 5.2.1. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See 1989 O.J. (L 40) 26; see also 2009 O.J. (L 170) 13-14 (containing provisions dealing 
with the independence of conformity assessment bodies involved in the certification of toys). 
 338. See O.J. 1993 (L 169) 4. 
 339. See Id. at 19-20. 
 340. 2008 O.J. (L218) 93. 
 341. 1993 O.J. (L 169) 59. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
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depend on the number of inspections carried out, nor on the results of the 
inspections.346 
Annex VII of the Medical Device Regulation contains additional 
criteria for the designation of notified bodies.  Such a body has to be 
organised and operated to safeguard the independence, objectivity and 
impartiality of its activities.  It needs to have procedures that guarantee the 
identification, investigation and resolution of any case in which conflicts of 
interest can arise.  Notified bodies are not allowed to engage in activities 
that may conflict with their independence of judgement or integrity in 
relation to conformity assessment activities for which they are designated.  
A notified body, its top-level management and personnel responsible for 
carrying out the conformity assessment tasks are also not allowed to offer or 
provide services which might jeopardise the confidence in their 
independence, impartiality or objectivity.  For instance, notified bodies are 
not allowed to provide consultancy services to the manufacturer, a supplier 
or a commercial competitor on the design, construction, marketing or 
maintenance of devices.  Notified bodies cannot be involved in the design, 
manufacture or construction, marketing, installation and use or maintenance 
of devices they assess.  Moreover, the level of the remuneration of the top-
level management and assessment personnel of notified bodies may not 
depend on the results of the assessments.347 
IV. THIRD STAGE OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS: ‘POST-ISSUANCE’ 
OBLIGATIONS 
Besides the analysis (obligation de moyen) and the independent 
issuance of a certificate (obligation de résultat), certifiers also have “post-
issuance” obligations during the last stage of the certification process.348  
Some of these obligations qualify as obligations de résultat.  Reference can, 
for example, be made to confidentiality requirements included in 
certification agreements.  There might thus be a basis for liability once a 
certifier violates this obligation by disclosing confidential information.349  In 
 
 346. 1993 O.J. (L 169) 59. 
 347. Annex VII, Article 1.2. Regulation 2017/745 on Medical Devices. 
 348. See infra Section IV. 
 349. Rating agreements, for instance, often require CRAs to keep confidential the information they 
receive from the issuer.  S&P Code of Conduct indicates that the CRA is not allowed to publish or 
disclose the rating to any party without the issuer’s consent.  The CRA may use confidential information 
in connection with the assignment and monitoring of the rating but is not allowed to directly disclose it 
to any other party.  The information can only be used for research and modelling purposes if it is not 
presented in a way that makes it possible to identify the issuer.  See STANDARD & POOR’S RATING 
SERVICES, supra note 113, at 4, 7.  Under the contract with Moody’s, the CRA reserves the right to 
publish the information given by the issuer unless it is confidential or inside information.  The IOSCO 
Code of Conduct as well as the individual codes of CRAs also contain several confidentiality duties.  See 
IOSCO, supra note 118, part 3.B at 12; Article 3.15 Moody’s, “Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct”, 
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addition to confidentiality requirements, a certifier also has monitoring and 
surveillance obligations during the last stage of the process.  The certifier’s 
monitoring and surveillance tasks during the third stage of the certification 
process are far more important.  These obligations can be imposed by the 
certification agreement or by legislation.  The obligation to perform these 
surveillance obligations can be labelled as an obligation de résultat.350  
There will thus be a basis for liability if a third-party certifier fails to 
periodically perform them or does not do so within the agreed time period.  
Based on these monitoring and surveillance activities, there can be reasons 
to suspend or withdraw the certificate.  The SGS Code of Practice, for 
example, provides that a certificate can be withdrawn if the products no 
longer conform to the applicable standards, norms, or regulations.351  
Certifiers can also suspend the certificate for a limited time under several 
other circumstances (for example, if the request for a corrective action has 
not been satisfactorily complied with, if products are marketed in an unsafe 
condition, if audits are not completed within the prescribed timeframe, or if 
there has been any violation of the certifier’s conditions of certification and 
codes of practice).352  The TüV terms and conditions of certification specify 
that the certificate will be withdrawn if the reasons for suspending it, for 
example when the client is temporarily unable to fulfill the certification 
requirements, are not remedied within the agreed period of time.353  Article 
56 of the Medical Device Regulation stipulates that when a manufacturer no 
longer meets the applicable requirements, a notified body is allowed to 
suspend or withdraw the certificate, unless compliance with the 
requirements is ensured by appropriate corrective action taken by the 
manufacturer within an appropriate deadline set by the notified body.  This 
requirement also qualifies as an obligation de résultat.  Put differently, if 
the monitoring and surveillance analysis shows that there are reasons to 
 
June 2017, 15. Classification societies are also bound by confidentiality requirements.  The terms and 
conditions of the marine service contract of Lloyds stipulate that the society has to keep confidential any 
data, plans or other technical information received from the shipowner except when disclosure is 
required by law or authorised by the shipowner. See, e.g., Contract Terms, LLOYDS REGISTER (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.cdlive.lr.org/conditions.asp.  Confidentiality requirements are also 
included in the delegation agreement between the RO and the flag State. See SWEDISH TRANSPORT 
AGENCY, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE DELEGATION OF STATUTORY CERTIFICATION AND SERVICES 
FOR SHIPS REGISTERED IN SWEDEN BETWEEN THE SWEDISH TRANSPORT AGENCY AND XXX, §7.2. 
 350. See, e.g., Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Medical Devices, and 
Amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, at 
5, COM (2012) 542 final (Sept. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Medical Devices] (“After initial certification, 
notified bodies must regularly conduct surveillance assessments in the post-market phase.”). 
 351. Article 16 SGS, Code of Practice, www.sgs.com/Terms-and-Conditions/Codes-of-Practice-
SSC-English-NL.aspx. 
 352. Id. at Art. 15. 
 353. TÜV RHEINLAND, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS (PZO) OF TÜV RHEINLAND 
LGA PRODUCTS GMBH (TRLP), at 1 (§§ 3.17, 3.18) (2016). 
44
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss2/2
2018] THIRD-PARTY CERTIFIERS 247 
 
withdraw or modify the certificate, there might be grounds for liability if the 
certifier does not do so regardless of the efforts that are made.354 
However, the way in which third-party certifiers have to conduct these 
monitoring and surveillance obligations is an obligation de moyen.  
Certifiers have to carefully perform these tasks without guaranteeing that 
the monitoring and surveillance is always successful.  There might be 
grounds for liability if certifiers negligently performed their monitoring 
tasks, even if it turns out the certificate has not been downgraded or 
withdrawn.355  Alternatively, if the certificate has not been downgraded or 
withdrawn, there is no basis  for liability if certifiers carefully performed the 
surveillance and monitoring.  Surveillance and monitoring duties find their 
basis in different sources such as (A) certification contract, codes of 
conduct/practice, or supranational legislation.  More importantly, several 
(B) reasons are used to show that a certifier’s monitoring and surveillance 
tasks qualify as obligations de moyen. 
A. Sources for a Third-Party Certifier’s Monitoring & Surveillance 
Obligations 
Monitoring and surveillance obligations find their basis in different 
sources.  For instance, Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct stipulates 
that when a rating is published, unless it is withdrawn, the CRA will at least 
once in any twelve-month period review the creditworthiness of the issuer 
or its products.356  To that end, surveillance teams continuously monitor and 
review the ratings.357  The CRA can also initiate a review of the status of the 
 
 354. There are also several other circumstances when third-party certifiers need to withdraw or 
suspend a certificate.  For instance, some rating contracts mention CRAs may raise, lower, suspend, 
place on CreditWatch or withdraw a rating at any time and at its sole discretion, especially when the 
information provided by the issuer or lack thereof requires the CRA to do so.  See e.g. MOODY’S, CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7.  Classification societies can also withdraw the certificates under several 
circumstances.  The certificate will be either automatically suspended or the classification society may 
withdraw it at any time and expel the ship from its register if the ship is not made accessible for a survey, 
or if necessary repairs are not completed in time, or if the vessel is used for other purposes than it is 
approved design. LAGONI, supra note 19, at 47-48; see IACS, supra note 177, at 5-6 & 11-12.  Whether 
ROs are allowed to withdraw statutory is less clear.  The Model Agreement states the circumstances 
under which a surveyor is allowed to withdraw the certificate.  See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION (IMO), MODEL AGREEMENT FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF RECOGNIZED 
ORGANIZATIONS ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION, Annex, art. 2.5, 
http://www.sjofartsverket.se/pages/7148/307.pdf (specifies that the RO endeavors to avoid undertaking 
activities which may result in a conflict of interest).  The agreement with the Swedish Transport 
Administration, however, specifies that the RO is not entitled to withdraw statutory certificates See 
SWEDISH TRANSPORT AGENCY, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE DELEGATION OF STATUTORY 
CERTIFICATION AND SERVICES FOR SHIPS REGISTERED IN SWEDEN BETWEEN THE SWEDISH TRANSPORT 
AGENCY AND XXX, §3.2. 
 355. See OJ (L 302) 4. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
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rating when it receives any information that might reasonably be expected 
to result in an action, such as lowering or withdrawing the rating.358  CRAs 
can upgrade and downgrade the rating or put the issuer on a Credit Watch 
(list)359 when the CRA plans to review the rating.360  Such a review is of 
particular importance for market participants.361  Whereas an upgrade might 
increase future investments, a downgrade indicates that the issuer is less 
able or willing to meet its financial obligations.362  CRAs will, therefore, 
inform issuers and investors of the intention to change the rating prior to 
publishing the downgrade or upgrade.363  This gives issuers an opportunity 
to adjust the design of financial instruments to avoid a downgrade.364  The 
IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals further stipulates that, “[e]xcept for 
ratings that clearly indicate they do not entail ongoing surveillance,” the 
CRA should on an on-going basis monitor the published rating by 
“regularly reviewing the issuer’s creditworthiness.”365  Ratings should be 
updated on a timely basis taking into account the results of the review.366  A 
same conclusion follows from different cases where the monitoring and 
surveillance duties of CRAs were examined.367 In CalPERS, it was held that 
the CRAs had to continuously monitor the financial structured products to 
ensure that the given ratings remained accurate. They had to withdraw any 
rating that was no longer representative of the rated products’ financial 
condition. In publishing a rating, the CRAs did not simply offer investors 
their best prediction, at the time the product was first marketed, as to 
whether they would eventually be paid in full on their investment. Rather, 
CRAs continuously examined the products’ market performance to ensure 
the rating was currently valid.368 The EU Regulation on CRAs also requires 
CRAs to monitor and review ratings on an on-going basis at least annually, 
 
 358. Id. 
 359. See Christian Hirsch & Christina E. Bannier, The Economic Function of Credit Rating 
Agencies: What does the Watchlist Tell us? 4 (Frankfurt School, Working Paper No. 124, 2009). 
 360. See id. at 3. 
 361. See id. at 1. 
 362. Stéphane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a 
Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L. J. 617, 627 (2006); Uwe BLAUROCK, Control and 
Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies, 11 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. LAW 1, 7 (2007). 
 363. DARBELLAY, supra note 18, at 37. 
 364. Id. 
 365. See IOSCO, supra note 118, at 5. 
 366. Id. at 5-6. 
 367. See e.g.Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 651 F. Supp. 2d 493; 
; In re Moody’s 599 F. Supp. 2d 493: King County, Washington et al v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 
et al, no. 09-08387, 31-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 
F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Financial 
Services LLC, 813 F.Supp.2d 871 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 
 368. California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Corp., Docket No. A134912, 
No. CGC-09-490241, n. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
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especially where material changes occurred that could have an impact on a 
rating.369 
Classification societies have surveillance and monitoring obligations in 
the form of surveys.370  Vessels are subject to a life survey regime if they 
want to be retained in class.371  There are different kinds of surveys.372  The 
Rules for Classification and Construction of former society Germanischer 
Lloyd stipulates that it has to perform regular periodical and non-periodical 
surveys of the vessel’s hull and machinery.373  Although the shipowner 
remains responsible to properly maintain the ship in between the surveys,374 
a classification society has the discretion to determine whether or not it will 
initiate a survey.375  ABS, for instance, reserves the right to perform 
unscheduled surveys of a vessel when it has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the shipowner does not comply with the applicable class rules.376 
Product certifiers can also be bound by monitoring and surveillance 
activities.377  The SGS Code of Practice, for example, stipulates that the 
certifier has to do periodic surveillances of the management system and 
products.378  To that end, the certifier has the right to visit the manufacturer 
unannounced.379  A surveillance agreement with TüV Rheinland specifies 
that the surveillance of the manufacturing plants is used to check whether 
the manufacturer of construction products complies with the applicable 
requirements.380  Once the certificate is issued for the construction of 
products, the certifier has to regularly assess whether the factory production 
control381 conforms to the relevant technical specifications.382 
 
 369. 2009 O.J. (L 302) 13. 
 370. See IOSCO, supra note 118, at 3. 
 371. IACS, supra note 177, at 5. 
 372. See id. at 13-14. 
 373. See GERMANISCHER LLOYD, RULES FOR CLASSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 2-14 (§. 
7.3.2) (2003) (“GL reserve the right to carry out inspections without giving prior notice.  The 
manufacturer shall grant GL Surveyors access to all areas and shall present all documentation 
concerning records and tests carried out.”). 
 374. IACS, supra note 177, at 11. 
 375. See, e.g., ABS, supra note 191, Part 1, ch. 1, § 2, R. 1.3. 
 376. Id. at R. 7. 
 377. SGS, CODE OF PRACTICE (SSC NL) 4 (2017), www.sgs.com/Terms-and-Conditions/Codes-
of-Practice-SSC-English-NL.aspx. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 5; see TÜV RHEINLAND, supra note 353, at 2, 4 (describing short-notice audits). 
 380. TÜV RHEINLAND INDUSTRIE SERVICE GMBH, SURVEILLANCE AND CERTIFICATION 
AGREEMENT 1 (Revision 3), 
https://www.tuv.com/media/poland/o_nas/zalaczniki_do_ofert/dp/Umowa_w_sprawie_inspekcji_i_certy
fikacji.pdf. 
 381. Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
relating to Construction Products, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 6 (stipulating that manufacturers may only affix the 
EC conformity marking on their construction products if they have “a factory production control system 
to ensure that production conforms with the relevant technical specifications.”).  Annex III of the 
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Notified bodies have different monitoring and surveillance obligations 
as well. The MDR, for instance, contains several obligations. Regarding 
class IIa, class IIb and class III medical devices, notified bodies must 
periodically, at least once every twelve months, carry out audits and 
assessments to ensure that the manufacturer applies the approved quality 
management system and post-market surveillance plan. These audits and 
assessments include inspections on the manufacturer’s premises as well as 
tests to check whether the quality management system is working 
properly.383 The notified body needs to randomly perform, at least once 
every five years, unannounced audits on the site of the manufacturer. Within 
the context of such unannounced on-site audits, the body has to test an 
adequate sample of the produced devices or an adequate sample from the 
manufacturing process to verify that the manufactured medical device is in 
conformity with the technical documentation.384 
Reference can also be made to Recommendation 2013/473 on audits 
and assessments performed by notified bodies.385 The Recommendation 
obliges notified bodies to perform unannounced audits of manufacturers of 
medical devices at least once every three year. The timing of the audits 
should be unpredictable. Notified bodies need to increase the frequency of 
unannounced audits if the devices bear a high risk, if the devices of the type 
in question are frequently non-compliant or if specific information gives 
rise to suspicions that the devices or their manufacturer do not comply with 
the applicable requirements. Notified bodies have to check a recently 
produced sample, preferably one taken from the ongoing manufacturing 
process, for its conformity with technical documentation and (applicable) 
legal requirements.386 
Before the implementation of the MDR and Recommendation 
2013/473, post-issuance obligations were also included in Annex II of the 
 
Directive Factory defines production control as the permanent internal control of production exercised 
by the manufacturer. Id.at 23. 
 382. TÜV Rheinland Industrie Service GmbH, Surveillance and Certification Agreement available 
at 
www.tuv.com/media/poland/o_nas/zalaczniki_do_ofert/dp/Umowa_w_sprawie_inspekcji_i_certyfikacji.
pdf. 
 383. Annex IX, Chapter I, Article 3.3. Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices. 
 384. Id. at Art. 3.4. 
 385. Annex III Recommendation 2013/473 on the audits and assessments performed by notified 
bodies in the field of medical devices. The Recommendation is divided into four parts including general 
provisions and three Annexes focusing on product assessment (Annex I), quality management system 
assessments (Annex II) and the unannounced audits themselves (Annex III). 
 386. Annex III, Recommendation 2013/473/EU on the audits and assessments performed by 
notified bodies in the field of medical devices. 
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MDD.387 The PIP breast implant case, however, showed that the scope and 
content of these obligations has not always been that clear under the MDD. 
In France, a large group of distributors and women brought a case 
before the Tribunal de Commerce in Toulon. The court held that TüV 
Rheinland negligently performed its obligations of control/inspection, care 
and vigilance.388 In its capacity of notified body, TüV had substantial power 
in its inspection role to ensure that the implants only contained the 
authorized gel. The court assumed that the body was required to make 
unannounced visits at the factory or on sites of the manufacturer.389 The 
Court of Appeal d’Aix-en-Provence, however, reversed the first instance 
decision and concluded that TüV complied with its obligations under EU 
law. The MDD provides solely for the possibility to make unannounced 
visits. There was no obligation to do so.390 
In a case before the German District Court in Nuremberg-Fürth, the 
victim’s claim was rejected as well. The court held that EU law did not 
require a notified body to investigate the specific implants or carry out 
unannounced inspections on the manufacturing site.391 The District Court in 
Frankenthal concluded TüV Rheinland had not breached its obligations 
included in Annex II of the MDD.392 The certifier has to check the 
conformity of the quality management system with the provisions of the 
MDD. Although the notified body undertook an audit of the quality 
management system, it did not have to examine whether the quality 
management as presented by PIP was also brought into practice.393 The 
audit of PIP’s quality system was merely a “document-based exercise”.394 
The notified body was also required to examine the design dossier 
containing information on the content and design of the implants. Once 
again, TüV was not obliged to inspect the actual implants.395 The District 
Court also held that the certifier had no obligation to do unannounced visits. 
 
 387. See in this regard Annex II, Articles 5.3. and 5.4. Directive 93/42 concerning medical 
devices. 
 388. Commercial Court Toulon, November 14, 2013, no. RG 2011F00517, no. 2013F00567, 144. 
 389. Id. at  142-143. 
 390. Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, July 2, 2015, no. 13/22482, part II(B)(1) in “Motifs de la 
décision” (“Il ne peut donc être reproché à l’organisme certifié de ne pas avoir procédé périodiquement 
aux inspections prévues à l’article 5.3. de l’annexe II de la directive 93/42/CEE”). 
 391. District Court Nürnberg-Fürth, September 25, 2013, 11 O 3900/13. See TüV Rheinland, “PIP 
Breast Implants: TÜV Rheinland Wins Another Case”, April, 10, 2013, 
www.tuv.com/en/malaysia/about_us_my/news_my/news-content_208551.html. 
 392. District Court Frankenthal, March 14, 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin 
Produkte Recht 2013, 134-138; van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 343-44. 
 393. District Court Frankenthal, March 14, 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin 
Produkte Recht 2013, 134-137. 
 394. van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 343-44. 
 395. District Court Frankenthal, March 14, 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin 
Produkte Recht 2013, 134-137; van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 344. 
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The MDD stipulates that the notified body may carry out such visits.396 An 
obligation would only arise if there were specific circumstances demanding 
for an unannounced visit. However, the plaintiff failed to show the existence 
of such circumstances.397 
The decision has been affirmed by the Oberlandesgericht in 
Zweibrücken, albeit on different grounds.398 More importantly, the OLG 
gave permission to appeal to the BGH. On the 9th of April 2015, the 
Bundesgerichtshof referred three questions on the interpretation of the MDD 
to the European Court of Justice.399 By its second and third questions, the 
BGH sought to ascertain whether the provisions of Annex II to the MDD 
are to be interpreted as meaning that a notified body is required in general, 
or at least where there is due cause, to do unannounced inspections/audits, 
to examine devices and/or to examine the manufacturer’s business 
records.400 
The European Court of Justice held that a notified body has no general 
obligation to carry out unannounced inspections, to examine medical 
devices and/or to examine the manufacturer’s business records.401 That 
being so, however, the notified body may pay unannounced visits to the 
manufacturer during which it may carry out or ask for tests to check if the 
quality system is working and applied properly.402 The notified body may 
also require, where duly justified, any information or data necessary for 
establishing and maintaining the attestation of conformity in view of the 
chosen procedure.403 The manufacturer must allow the notified body to 
carry out all the inspections necessary and provide it with all relevant 
information.404 
B. Monitoring and Surveillance Obligations 
Regardless of the many sources imposing surveillance and monitoring 
obligations on certifiers, the way they have to be performed qualifies as 
obligation de moyen.  This can be illustrated by two reasons coming from 
 
 396. Annex II, Article 5.4. Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices. 
 397. District Court Frankenthal, March 14, 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin 
Produkte Recht 2013, 134-137; van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 344. 
 398. Court of Appeal Zweibrücken, January 30, 2014, 4 U 66/13. See for a discussion and 
translation of the case: W. Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, 
TaylorWessing, (May 2015); van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 344-45. 
 399. BGH, April, 9, 2015 - VII ZR 36/14. 
 400. C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof lodged on 13 May 2015. 
 401. C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2017] E.C.R. paras. 
38, 40. 
 402. Annex II, Articles 5.3. and 5.4. Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices. 
 403. Article 11, 10. of Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices. 
 404. Annex II, Article 5.2. Directive 93/42 concerning medical devices. 
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different certification sectors.  First, the certifier is often not the only party 
involved in the surveillance and monitoring process.  Several other parties 
such as national authorities or the requesting entity can also play a role in 
the last stage of the certification process (1).  Second, there is case law 
showing that certifiers are bound by an obligation de moyen when it comes 
to their monitoring and surveillance obligations (2). 
1. Third-Party Certifiers & Interplay With Other Actors During 
the Third Stage 
One reason why certifiers are bound by an obligation de moyen relates 
to the interplay with other entities coming on stage once the certificate has 
been issued.  In the medical sector, for instance, national competent 
authorities also play an important role after the marketing of the device.  
Those authorities have several obligations under EU law once a device has 
been marketed.  They have to do appropriate checks on the characteristics 
and performance of devices, including, where appropriate, a review of 
documentation and physical or laboratory checks on the basis of adequate 
samples.405  The competent authorities have to carry out both announced 
and if necessary unannounced inspections of the premises of economic 
operators such as the manufacturer and, where necessary, at the facilities of 
professional users.406  If the competent authority believes that the medical 
device presenting a health or safety risk does not comply with the applicable 
requirements, it can take several post-market actions (e.g. withdrawing the 
device from the market or recalling it within a reasonable period).407 
The decisions by the German and French courts in the PIP case 
illustrate the ambiguity regarding the obligations of notified bodies and the 
interplay with national authorities during the third stage of the certification 
process.  The District Court in Frankenthal emphasised there was a 
distinction between duties of notified bodies on the one hand and the 
obligations of national public market surveillance agencies on the other 
hand. Notified bodies cannot be qualified as market surveillance agencies 
and do not have the same powers. Instead, notified bodies only play a role 
in the conformity assessment procedure of devices.408 On appeal, the OLG 
in Zweibrücken also stressed the separation of duties between notified 
bodies and competent authorities. Certification cannot be placed at the same 
level as post-market surveillance activities. Competent authorities remain 
 
 405. Article 93.1 Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices. 
 406. Article 93.3 Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices. 
 407. Articles 94 & 95 Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices. 
 408. District Court Frankenthal, March 14, 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin 
Produkte Recht 2013, 135-136; van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 344. 
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responsible to monitor and control products that have been marketed.409 In 
France, the Commercial Court in Toulon held that notified bodies 
effectively assume a public role. As a consequence, they guarantee that the 
product has reached a certain standard of safety whenever they certify it. 
The functions performed by TüV Rheinland constituted a real delegation of 
public services by national authorities. In its capacity of notified body, TüV 
Rheinland had substantial power in its inspection role to ensure that the 
implants only contained the authorised gel.410 The first instance decisions 
was, however, reversed by the Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence. This might 
be an indication that French courts adhere to the same stance as their 
German counterparts.411 
Whether a certifier’s obligations are successfully accomplished can also 
depend upon the cooperation of the requesting entity itself. Take the 
situation of classification societies. Vessels are subject to a lifelong survey 
regime if they want to be retained in class. However, it is the shipowner 
who remains responsible to properly maintain the vessel in the period 
between the surveys. He has to inform the society of events or 
circumstances that affect the conformity of the ship with class rules. 
Although classification societies have monitoring and surveillance duties, 
the shipowner might thus have to trigger societies to actually perform them. 
The effectiveness of the classification depends upon the shipbuilder or 
shipowner cooperating with the society in an open and transparent manner 
on all issues affecting its status. To that end, the shipowner has to act in 
good faith by disclosing to the society any damage or deterioration that may 
influence the vessel’s classification status. If there is any doubt, the owner 
should notify the society and schedule a survey to decide if the vessel is still 
complies with the relevant class rules.412 
The importance of a requesting entity’s cooperation and its influence on 
the certifier’s services became clear as well in the PIP case. The impact of 
the manufacturer’s fraud in the production process was disparate. Whereas 
some breast implants contained the required medical silicone gel, others had 
a mixture of medical and industrial silicone gel or only industrial gel. The 
manufacturer’s fraud and lack of cooperation made an accurate inspection 
of the implants extremely difficult. Thus, the requesting entity might 
commit fraud the certifier will not always discover.413  
 409. Court of Appeal Zweibrücken, January 30, 2014, 4 U 66/13.  See for translation and 
discussion of the case: W. Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, 
TaylorWessing, (May 2015); van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 343-48. 
 410. Commercial Court Toulon, November 14, 2013, no. RG 2011F00517, 2013F00567, 142-143. 
See  also van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 345-46. 
 411. Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, July 2, 2015, no. 13/22482. 
 412. IACS, supra note 177, at 5. 
 413. See for more information and references the discussion supra in part xx. 
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A last example relates to the certifier’s remuneration by the requesting 
entity. The way certifiers are paid the certification fee by the requesting 
entity does not always induce them to carefully perform the post-issuance 
activities. The model where the certifier is paid by the requesting entity 
leads to a disincentive to adequately monitor the certified item when a 
downgrade or withdrawal of the certificate is appropriate.414 In this regard, 
CRAs can serve as illustration. Investors already brought several claims 
against CRAs,415 alleging that they failed to duly monitor the underlying 
assets for significant decreases in the quality of the securities that investors 
purchased.416 
CRAs charge surveillance fees for monitoring services, either upfront or 
annually. Performing adequate and surveys on time is important considering 
that issuers of structured products do not always make the underlying loan 
performance or other information publicly available.417 Based on the issuer-
pays-business model, CRAs are encouraged to give issuers favourable 
ratings to generate revenues. However, they have little incentives to provide 
monitoring services or downgrade the securities when necessary.418 
One reason thereto is because the issuer pays for the continuing 
surveillance of securities in advance. In addition, few issuers are eager to let 
CRAs monitor their securities considering that it could result in 
downgrades.419 During the initial rating process, the issuer tries to assure 
CRAs that they are getting the “the complete picture by providing both bad 
information and good [on the creditworthiness]” (internal quotations marks 
omitted).420 Thereafter, the company is no longer induced to voluntarily 
bring any negative information to the CRA’s attention.421 Consequently, 
 
 414. N. Horner, If You Rate It, He Will Come: Why Uncle Sam’s Recent Intervention with the 
Credit Rating Agencies Was Inevitable and Suggestions for Future Reform, 41 FLORIDA ST, U. L.R.499 
(2014); T.J. Pate, Triple-A Ratings Stench: May the Credit Rating Agencies be Held Accountable?, 2 
BARRY L.R. 36 (2010). 
 415. See, e.g.,  In Re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative, 511 F.Supp.2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005); 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Corp., No. CGC-09-490241 (Cal. Super. 
2010); California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Corp., Docket No. A134912, No. 
CGC-09-490241, paras. 30-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); In Re Moody’s, 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 ; Lasalle 
National Bank, 951 F. Supp. 1071.. 
 416. T.J. Pate, Triple-A Ratings Stench: May the Credit Rating Agencies be Held Accountable?, 2 
BARRY L.R. 36 (2010). 
 417. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Summary Report of Issues Identified in 
the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies, (July 2008) 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf. 
 418. N.S. Ellis, L.M. Fairchild, F. D’Souza, Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies a 
Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis,  17 STAN. J. 
OF L., BUS. & FIN., 191 n. 66  (2012). 
 419. J.D. Krebs, The Rating Agencies: Where We Have Been and Where Do We Go From Here?, 
3  J. OF BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE L. 141 (2009). 
 420. C. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASHINGTON U. L. Q. 70 (2004). 
 421. Id. 
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credit ratings are mostly downgraded long after public information has 
signaled a deterioration in the issuer’s probability of default.422 Moreover, 
CRAs can obtain information from other actors involved in overlapping 
commercial activities during the initial rating process (e.g. investment banks 
or law firms). However, as time goes by and the CRA needs to monitor the 
initial rating, it becomes more difficult to acquire information from other 
sources or actors as they are no longer involved in the surveillance of 
issuers.423 
2. Monitoring and Surveillance Obligations in Case Law 
The post-issuance obligations of certifiers have also been addressed in 
different cases. An analysis of these decisions shows that certifiers are 
bound by an obligation de moyen when it comes to monitoring and 
surveillance obligations. There is no basis for liability if certifiers carefully 
performed the surveillance and monitoring tasks when the certified item 
defaults despite the existence of a favourable certificate. The PIP breast 
implant case as well as decisions in the context of CRAs can be used as 
illustration in this regard. 
The French Commercial Court in Toulon, for instance, held in the PIP 
case that TüV Rheinland negligently performed its obligations of control, 
inspection, care and vigilance. The certifier was held liable because it did 
not apply the normally required diligence and care during its post-issuance 
obligations. A reasonable and prudent certifier placed in the situation of 
TüV would have conducted an announced inspection even if this was not 
mandatory under EU law.424 The certifier was not prudent or vigilant 
enough as it never performed unannounced inspections at the factory or on 
sites of the manufacturer to examine the implants despite having the right to 
so under the MDD. One small-scale unannounced visit would have made it 
possible to detect that the products did not fall under the remit of the 
certified manufacturing process.425 
TüV Rheinland appealed against the first instance decision. The body 
claimed it complied with the applicable requirements. TüV argued that it 
was only responsible for controlling the design and the quality system and 
not the implants themselves. The certifier also argued it had been 
systematically deceived by PIP which presented false documents. TüV did 
not have sufficient powers under the MDD to take further actions to unmask 
 
 422. Krebs, supra note 419. 
 423. Hill, supra note 420. 
 424. Commercial Court Toulon, November 14, 2013, no. RG 2011F00517, no. 2013F00567, 84-
89 & 144. 
 425. Commercial Court Toulon, November 14, 2013, no. RG 2011F00517, 2013F00567, 142-143; 
van Leeuwen, supra note 104, at 345-46. 
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the fraud. The Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence followed this reasoning and 
reversed the first instance decision. The court of appeal concluded that TüV 
Rheinland complied with its obligations under supranational law.426 
In Germany, the OLG Zweibrücken concluded that the MDD did not 
impose any statutory obligation on the notified body to intervene to protect 
all patients that might come into contact with devices. The certification of a 
device is only a prerequisite for placing it on the market.427 Even if a duty of 
care would exist, the OLG concluded that the notified body would have 
acted culpably (Verschulden) in order to face liability. The body would have 
to have committed a demonstrable mistake in carrying out the conformity 
assessment. This occurs when the certifier does not adequately comply with 
its monitoring duties and it or ought to have been aware of this fact. 
However, the court held that the notified body conducted inspections on a 
regular basis without being required to establish when inspections would 
exactly take place. The certifier was not obliged to perform unannounced 
audits of the manufactures, which would not even have brought to light 
PIP’s fraud with the implants.428 
It has already been mentioned that the case made it to the ECJ in a 
preliminary ruling. Advocate General SHARPSTON also acknowledged that 
notified bodies have surveillance obligations. Annex II to the MDD should 
be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of class III devices, the notified 
body responsible for auditing the quality system, examining the design of 
the product and “surveillance” is under a “duty to act with all due care and 
diligence”.429  Several elements of the Advocate General’s reasoning point 
towards a qualification of an obligation de moyen. For instance, if a notified 
body considers it necessary to examine medical devices and/or the 
manufacturer’s business records, the manufacturer is bound to allow it to do 
so. The ECJ, however, cannot lay down precise guidelines as to whether 
such a body is under a duty to carry out an examination, nor when it has to 
perform unannounced inspections. That will be a matter to be assessed by 
the national court on a case-by-case basis. The main question thereby will 
 
 426. Court of Appeal Aix-en-Provence, July 2, 2015, no. 13/22482 concluding that “Les 
appelantes personnes physiques, les intimés et intervenantes ne rapportent nullement l’existence d’une 
faute de la société AK, et/ou de la société AM”. 
 427. Court of Appeal Zweibrücken, January 30, 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 2. d); van Leeuwen, 
supra note 104, at 344-45. ; W. Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, 
TaylorWessing, (May 2015). 
 428. Court of Appeal Zweibrücken, January 30, 2014, 4 U 66/13.  See for a translation: W. 
Rehmann & D. Heimhalt, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, TaylorWessing, (May 2015). 
 429. Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2016] E.C.R. 
para. 61. 
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be what a notified body acting with all due care and diligence would have 
done in the same circumstances.430 
The judgement by the ECJ stipulates that a notified body does not have 
a general obligation to carry out unannounced inspections, to examine 
devices and/or a manufacturer’s business records. When there is evidence 
indicating a medical device may not comply with the applicable 
requirements, the notified body has to take all necessary steps to ensure that 
it fulfils its obligations.431 The ECJ proceeds and writes that notified bodies 
are under a “general obligation to act with all due diligence”432 when 
engaged in a procedure relating to the Declaration of Conformity. Whereas 
such wording might point towards an obligation de résultat, the underlying 
reasons of coming to that conclusion illustrate that a body’s monitoring and 
surveillance tasks during the third stage more likely qualify as obligation de 
moyen.433 
Notified bodies must be allowed an “appropriate degree of 
discretion”434 to determine whether a device does or does not comply with 
the applicable requirements. A notified body’s obligations would be a “dead 
letter” 435 if the degree of discretion is unlimited. The notified body is under 
a “duty to be alert” during the last stage of the process.436 Arguably, a 
notified body will violate this duty when a reasonable notified body placed 
in the same circumstances would have been alerted by a medical device not 
complying with the applicable requirements. When performing this duty 
and finding evidence indicating that a device may not comply with the 
applicable requirements, the notified body must then take all steps necessary 
to ensure it fulfils its obligations under the MDD.437 
The monitoring and surveillance obligations of CRAs have also been 
addressed in different cases. These cases illustrate that a CRA’s post-
issuance monitoring duties will more likely qualify as obligations de moyen. 
In Ohio Police v. Standard & Poor’s, the complaint asserted a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiffs claimed that the CRAs owed 
them “a duty to act with reasonable care”438 when preparing, assigning, 
maintaining and disseminating the ratings. The CRAs allegedly breached 
this duty inter alia by failing to adequately monitor the structured finance 
 
 430. Id. at para. 57. 
 431. C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2017] E.C.R. para. 48. 
 432. Id. at para. 46. 
 433. Also see the discussion supra in footnote xx. 
 434.  
C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, [2017] E.C.R. para. 48. 
 435. Id. at para. 45. 
 436. Id. at para. 47. 
 437. Id. at para. 47. 
 438. Ohio Police, 813 F.Supp.2d at 875 . 
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securities they rated. The complaint alleged that the CRAs failed to conduct 
surveillance due to a lack of personnel and inadequate models to track 
required developments.439 A claim of negligent misrepresentation in Ohio 
requires that a person failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in 
obtaining or communicating the information.440 Thus, a CRA will not be 
held liable merely because the given ratings are not updated. Instead, there 
will be a basis for liability when CRA did not exercise reasonable care or 
competence during its monitoring duties (e.g. by using inadequate models to 
track required developments).441 
Reference can also be made to the Lasalle case. The plaintiffs argued 
their financial losses would have been prevented if Duff & Phelps had 
properly done the initial investigation and the post-issuance monitoring that 
it claimed to perform. To monitor the continued accuracy of its ratings, the 
CRA required the issues to submit detailed reports containing 
information.442 The plaintiffs filed a claim against the CRA on the ground of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, which are more 
thoroughly discussed in part xx. These provisions prohibit fraudulent 
activities in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. One element 
a plaintiff must allege to state a prima facie case of a violation of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is that a CRA acted with scienter.443 
The Supreme Court defined scienter as a “mental state embracing intent 
to deceive, manipulate or defraud”.444 To underpin a claim brought under 
Section 10(b), the plaintiff is required to show “fraudulent intent or 
recklessness rising to the level of conscious behavior”.445 The District Court 
for the Southern District of New York eventually held that plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged sufficient facts to create the strong inference that Duff & 
Phelps acted with fraudulent intent or recklessness. The Court held that the 
CRA’s self-described due diligence process would have alerted it of the 
issuer’s violation of the bond program as designed or approved by Duff & 
Phelps. The fact this did not happen constitute strong circumstantial 
evidence that the CRA either had knowledge of these violations or willfully 
disregarded the violations. In other words, Duff & Phelps’ Bond ratings 
were made with knowledge of falsity or at least extreme recklessness.446 
 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. at 880. See on claims of negligent misrepresentation also the discussion infra in part xx. 
 441. Id. at 879-85. 
 442. Lasalle National Bank,  951 F. Supp. at 1082. 
 443. Id. Lasalle National Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071, 1082 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 444. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 445. O’Brien v. Price Waterhouse, 740 F.Supp. 276, 280 (S.D.N.Y.1990). 
 446. Lasalle National Bank951 F. Supp. at 1087. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS – THE OBLIGATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFIERS 
The article shed light on the obligations of certifiers during the 
certification process.  There are three stages during the certification process, 
each of them giving rise to different obligations for certifiers.447  First, a 
certifier has several obligations before issuing the certificate (“pre-issuance 
obligations”).448  The most important one is to analyze the item or related 
information that needs to be certified.449  This analysis makes it 
subsequently possible to determine the certificate.450  This obligation 
qualifies as an obligation de moyen.451  As such, there should only be 
grounds for liability when the certifier did not carefully perform the 
analysis.452  The second stage relates to the issuance of an independent 
certificate.453  All certifiers have to remain independent towards the 
requesting entity.454  This is labelled as an obligation de résultat.455  
Therefore, certifiers could face liability simply because they did not issue an 
independent certificate, irrespective of the level of care they applied.456  
Finally, certifiers have “post-issuance” obligations during the last stage of 
the certification process.457  The most important one relates to monitoring 
and surveying the item that has been certified.458  This is an obligation de 
moyen.459  Certifiers will only face liability to the extent that they did not 
carefully perform their post-issuance surveillance and monitoring services, 
regardless of the question whether the certificate has been suspended, 
withdrawn, or updated.460  When there are reasons to withdraw or change 
the certificate, and the third-party certifiers fail to do so, there can be 
grounds for liability.461  This has been qualified as an obligation de 
résultat.462 
The combination of both axes shows that third-party certifiers will not 
face liability only because the certificate does not correspond with the 
“true” or “actual value” of the certified item.  Instead, there are grounds for  
 447. See supra Sections II-IV. 
 448. See TaylorWessing, Medical devices: liability of notified bodies?, SYNAPSE (May 2015), 
www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/may15.html. 
 449. See supra Section II.A. 
 450. See supra III. 
 451. See supra Section II.A. 
 452. See supra Section II.A-C. 
 453. See supra Section III. 
 454. See supra Section III.B.1-3. 
 455. See supra Section III.B. 
 456. See supra Section III. 
 457. See supra Section IV. 
 458. See id. 
 459. See id. 
 460. See id. 
 461. See id. 
 462. See supra Section IV. 
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liability if the certifier did not act as a reasonable and prudent certifier in the 
first (analysis of the information) or third stages (surveillancing and 
monitoring duties).463  There might be grounds for liability when the 
certifier did not remain independent towards the requesting entity during the 
second stage, regardless of the degree of care it applied to ensure its 
independence.464  The certifier might also face liability if the monitoring and 
surveillance analysis indicated that there were grounds to withdraw or 
suspend the certificate but failed to do so.465  This framework could be taken 
into account by policymakers when crafting liability regimes for third-party 
certifiers or gatekeepers. 
An example can illustrate the stages in the certification process.  
Suppose that a certifier issues a certificate that does not correspond with the 
“true” or “real value” of the certified item: a triple A rating for financial 
instruments that later default, a certificate for a vessel that sinks, or a 
certificate for breast implants that subsequently cause injuries.  It is then 
required to examine in which stage of the certification process it could have 
gone wrong.466  There will be a basis for liability if the certifier performed 
an analysis of the item or used a methodology that no reasonable and 
prudent certifier placed in the same circumstances would have done or used 
(first stage)467.  There is also a risk of liability if the certifier did not remain 
independent towards the requesting entity, for example, because it offered 
consultancy services or assisted in the design of the item (second stage).468  
A grounds for liability might also exist if third-party certifiers do not 
carefully perform their monitoring and surveillance duties.469  This can be 
the case if the third-party certifier does not take the necessary steps to 
ensure that the certificate still corresponds with the value of the certified 
item.470  However, the mere fact that a certificate no longer corresponds 
with the “true value” of the certified item is no reason why liability should 
be imposed.471  It is only when the certifier does not conduct its surveillance 
and monitoring duties with the required care and skill that there is grounds 
for liability (third stage).472 
 
 
 463. See supra Sections II, IV. 
 464. See supra Section III. 
 465. See supra Section IV. 
 466. See supra Section I. 
 467. See supra Section II. 
 468. See supra Section III.B. 
 469. See supra Section IV. 
 470. See id. 
 471. See id. 
 472. See id. 
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